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The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to 
expect a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only 
acceptance or rejection.[…] The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say 
that the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its 
turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead.  
 
– G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis deals with and defends the position in environmental philosophy known as 
environmental pragmatism. Contextualized against the dominant background of monistic non-
anthropocentric theories in environmental ethics, this position attempts an alternative account 
both of intrinsic value in non-human nature, and of the task of ethics in itself. Presenting some 
contributions from such authors as Bryan Norton, Anthony Weston, Andrew Light, Kelly 
Parker and Ben Minteer, the work attempts to promote a stronger practical orientation in 
environmental ethics which seeks to make contributions to solving concrete problems and 
become relevant to environmental policy. As a continuation of this project, I suggest a further 
expansion which I call ‘systematism’ which attempts to reorient ethics in light of large scale 
social dynamics and their implications for agency and an effective ethical framework. 
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Preface 
 
From a very young age, there was a distinct sense in my mind about the importance of 
sustainability and finitude. At about 4 or 5 I remember realizing that pealing snots from my 
nose and flicking them on the floor, was not a good idea if left unchecked in the long run. At 
about 10, I once declared to my parents how, when I grew up I would combat deforestation by 
ensuring every chopped tree be replaced by 10 more. My understanding, I hope, has since 
evolved, but my attitude, no doubt remained the same. Thus, my interest was soon sparked upon 
discovering environmental philosophy as an undergraduate. That year’s semester paper, 
however, proved to be a limited arena for exploring the many ideas that had caught my attention. 
My agreements with some of them, and indeed reservations against others were left 
unsatisfactorily articulated, some of which I hope will be better served here. 
The current work attempts to form a picture of these reservations and present an alternative 
position, which I luckily discovered as sharing many of my own concerns. This somewhat 
unknown position, known as environmental pragmatism, is here my main area of inquiry put 
against a background of clustering ethical positions, which I argue constitute a main paradigm 
in the field today. The criticism of these positions, known as monistic non-anthropocentrisms, 
contains both an ethical and a meta-ethical component. The first level ethical objection is that 
their approach to ethical theory in general is too atomistic and too theoretically confined to 
absolutes and dualistic distinctions. The atomistic and foundational concept of value 
fundamental to such ethics fails to capture the relational and interchanging character of values 
which  defines our experience with them and which serve not only identity value attain their 
identities through their relationship to other values. I attempt to outline an alternative pragmatic 
understanding of value, which abandons the effort to capture the exact nature of each value in 
isolation. Thus, it takes a pluralistic approach to ethics, attempting to open the doors for 
cooperation. It blurs the many sharp distinctions and exclusive categories often made by 
monistic theories, thereby rejecting the paradigmatic project of finding moral grounding in an 
Archimedean point.  
 The meta-ethical argument is that it is inadequate when returning too little of practical value 
to the struggles with environmental causes. Environmental pragmatists often suggest rather an 
approach, which is focused on making relevant contributions to policy or social movements, 
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rather than delving deeper into the complexities and irresolvable differences of value theory. 
Rather, they suggest that taking a basis in the myriad intuitions of natural value that are already 
present and build upon them to cultivate better conduct in the face of urgent environmental 
problems.  
Building on this effort comes my own attempt to expand the horizon of environmental 
pragmatism. I try to take a systemic viewpoint to ask whether the environmental problems and 
environmental destructiveness and behaviour may be attacked from different angles than only 
moral ones. It seems that many are already clear on what needs to be done to avoid 
environmental destruction, but that there are further systemic, social and psychological 
obstacles in between, which seems to escape the scope of ethical theory. I suggest that a wider 
holistic notion of agency which includes higher order hierarchies may be of help in discovering 
new sources of moral agency that seems unavailable in the atomistic conception of the agent. 
Further, in the attempt to reveal the obstacles preventing environmental adaption, I argue that 
empirical human or social sciences may help in forming better models of how behavioural, 
political and social change is possible from the systemic level, an empirical approach much in 
line with the empirical aspirations of pragmatism. 
In the following text, the terms ‘environmental pragmatism’ and simply ‘pragmatism’ are 
sometimes used interchangeably. Hopefully, context will reveal the intended sense.  
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 Background: 
 
How are we to understand the lacking success of the environmental 
movement? 
 
Only about 50 years since the benchmark publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, 
environmental philosophy has developed to an astounding level of complexity and 
sophistication. Being not only one of the youngest independent fields in philosophy, it has also 
faced the added challenge of continuously adapting to our growing knowledge of environmental 
issues and the new needs posed to moral theory. When for instance the go-to giants of classical 
ethics are proving unfruitful outside the context of purely human subjects, theory has had to be 
recast in order to accommodate the new non-human occupants of the moral community. It has 
thus had to step outside the comfort zone of its regular theoretical frameworks in order to adjust 
to the externally given premises of the problems, and an ever-developing empirical 
understanding of their nature. Rachel Carson’s scientific methodology earned pervasive 
scholarly attention to environmental issues through her work on the ecologically destabilizing 
effects of chemical pollutants. The emphasis in the philosophical debate, however, has since 
adjusted in light of changes to our understanding and updated empirical knowledge. In this 
sense, the debate simply does not enjoy the theoretical freedom and detachment as many other 
forms of philosophy, as it is forced to navigate in accordance with a developing body of 
knowledge. Its task, then, is perhaps not to be an independent, self-informed field, but rather to 
fill out the intellectual gaps as our scientific and empirical knowledge expands. This empirical 
feature is perhaps something that could worry any philosopher who is tempted to interpret the 
outside world according to their preconceived a-priori ideas, rather than sculpting their ideas 
according to the landscape of the outside world. As such, this radically adaptive power of 
environmental ethics ever since its beginnings has truly been a monument to the continued 
resilience of philosophy today. 
 
However, the antagonisms of environmental philosophy are far from resolved. Still after 50 
years of hard environmental work, disappointingly little appears to be happening in terms of 
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changed behaviours and policies, and the moral appeals of philosophers and environmentalists 
to change actions appear to fall consistently on deaf ears. As global ecological and 
environmental conditions spiral ever more rapidly towards irredeemable damage for 
generations to come, many theorists are now raising questions to why environmentalists are 
unable to exert the necessary counterforce to the development. Currently, deep-rooted 
detrimental forces thrust forward at a speed far outdoing that of their countermeasures. As 
environmental NGOs, pro-environmental policy and pro-environmental opinion are indeed 
gaining impetus every day, they seem to follow incremental, rather than logarithmic growth 
patterns that is needed to grow sufficiently forceful. Being still regarded on par with myriad 
other charitable or ideal causes, the critical mass of a global breakthrough seems still far in the 
horizon for any widespread drastic change to occur within the projected timeframes before 
pervasive damage gets irredeemable.  
While environmental philosophy, with its increasing attention devoted to it in philosophy, is 
indeed also a successful field in terms of its increasing theoretical development, its progress 
measured as an applied practical field seem rather bleak. Also, as forceful climate commitments 
consistently escape top political summits, individual environmental awareness even seems to 
decline world-wide (Tangeland, 2013; Twenge, Keith, & Freeman, 2012). Perhaps predictably 
so? Following Garrett Hardin’s game theoretical perspective with the Tragedy of the Commons 
(2008a), success might not only be a question of speaking environmental moral messages 
quantitatively louder, but also to hit the right approach qualitatively. If certain issues are 
inherently systemic, as according to Hardin, political social engineering seems more adapt than 
the overwhelmingly individual moral mobilization of today in breaking these patterns. At any 
rate, when previous approaches are not working something needs to be changed, it seems, and 
the movement needs to be scrutinized to find the source of its shortcomings.  
In light of these shortcomings, environmental philosophers are faced with many questions: Why 
is the global breakthrough of the environmental movement taking so long? And perhaps more 
importantly: Why has environmental philosophy, as dealing with the most fundamental 
perceptions and approaches to environmental issues, not played a greater role in guiding this 
breakthrough? Can its suggestions make claims to be bringing about the large-scale social, 
political and infrastructural changes necessary? Is philosophy today in any way connected to 
the movement of environmentalism at all? To the extent that the environmental movement 
represents the muscles, environmental philosophy should most definitely be the brains. Given 
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this fundamentality to the essential framing of environmental questions, it seems strange that it 
should not play a greater role to the way we conduct our response. Rather, environmental 
philosophers today are in fact barely visible in the public environmental debate outside of its 
narrow academic circles.  
 
As pointed out by Ben Minteer, compared to other fields such as bioethics, environmental 
philosophy and ethics seem hardly ever noted at all by politicians and environmental lawmakers 
(2012, p. 3). In bio-ethics, philosophical theory is well established as an applied discipline and 
constitutes a theoretical basis for real life choices within bio-research. There is a strong 
connection between the abstractly theoretical and the practically concrete constituents of this 
field. Oddly enough, his relationship does not seem to be nourished between environmental 
philosophy and its practical counterpart in environmental decision-making. If we admit that 
environmental ethics, like bio-ethics, also contains a practical mission beyond that of its purely 
theoretical mission, it may seem like its procedures are in need of adjustment once more to fill 
this practical side of the equation; and if comparable to the role of bioethics, it hardly seems the 
case that any other discipline may take its place in guiding fundamental perceptions in way we 
approach its subject. It seems to me that a large responsibility then rests on the shoulders of 
environmental philosophers and ethicists to try and conceive of theoretical understandings at 
the fundamental level which may ultimately be of help in leveraging environmental progress 
not only in philosophy, but on the concrete material ground-level. I suggest we follow Marx, if 
in nothing else, then in his famous aphorism that philosophy should not only try to interpret the 
world, it should also try to change it.  
 
Some are more reserved towards such a proposed mission for philosophy, stating that its job at 
best is to observe from the sideline and discover true statements about its field of inquiry, and 
not itself to get involved to make certain true. Sure enough, this appears to have been the rule 
in the history of philosophy. However, like bio-ethics, the importance and relevance of 
environmental ethics seem to hinge strongly on the reality and urgency of the problems with 
which it is concerned. Minteer reminds us of what sparked the movement for the beginning:  
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“If this seems an unfair standard for evaluating an academic discipline, especially a branch of philosophy 
(which often measures itself by its ability to transcend the affairs of daily life), we should remember that 
a major part of the justification of the field when it formed in the 1970s was to provide a focused 
philosophical response to society’s environmental problems.’(2012, p. 1) 
 
Clearly, no one can be forced to abandon their projects solely because there might be other 
‘more important’ pursuits. As critics of utilitarianism have long noted, if doing anything less 
than that of optimal utility is impermissible, most aspects of everyday lives will fall short of the 
requirement (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2014). This dispute on the task and boundary of philosophy, 
however, I think relies quite heavily, but also quite simply on the tacit underlying questions we 
set for our inquiry. Considering philosophy not as pre-given program, but rather only as a form 
of inquiry like sciences or arts defined without regards for its content, we might allow ourselves 
a different approach. For ethics, particularly, the usual premise of inquiry has been some version 
of the question regarding what it is we ought to do.  Still, an equally pertinent question, if we 
realize we may pose it, can be a subtly different one, wiz. how we can do what we ought to do. 
For in the field of ethics and environmental ethics specifically, the problem is not so much that 
we have no general ideas of what should be done. We mostly know we should employ 
sustainable and fair practices while avoiding over-consumption, pollution and depletions1 – but 
still it seems we do not know how to make ourselves do those things consistently. We 
systematically find ourselves and others doing the opposite. Many times, it does not seem there 
is a real choice. Even when wanting to do the better thing, there may arise an inner conflict in 
which the close and particular always overpowers the remote and ideal. We want to use the car 
less, but we need to get to work on time. We want to support animal welfare but organic farming 
products are expensive. The house always wins, it seems. Furthermore the average repertoire 
of what individuals can do that matters is limited, which further increases the bar to a point 
where most people could feel rather helpless. As long as individual costs of choosing 
environmentally are high, but big scale benefits are minute, selfless environmental rationality 
is bound by design to fail to self-interested rationality.  
There seems to be an abundance of such game-theoretical aporias like that of the prisoner’s 
dilemma inherent in the structure of the problems (Ariansen, 1992, pp. 86–95), but such analysis 
almost categorically escapes the scope of environmental ethics which is concerned only with 
                                                 
1 More on the converging practical agreements among philosophers in chap. 2.5 
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the normative dimensions of the first-person perspective. When for instance the United States 
Senate famously refused to ratify the 1997 Kyoto protocol, the reasons provided were heavily 
concerned with how many other nations that signed as well (Gonya, 2010). If not all other major 
nations like India and China were to sign first, it seemed to make no sense that the United States 
should do so.  
This is analogous to other historical stalemates, like the arms-race of the Cold War, where the 
question was not if it should be stopped, as much as it was how it could be stopped. Both parties 
would agree to the former, as neither is better off with the situation. However, they found 
themselves locked in a systemic pattern of continuous terror balance. It is almost as if there is 
a collective weakness of will at play, where we as the human species are now largely aware of 
the predicaments of environmental issues, but are unable to break the pattern of our collective 
behaviour causing them. If anything is to be learned by weakness of will cases and by 
philosophy at all, it is that human actions depend not in a simplistic manner only on knowing 
what the right actions would be. It depends also on knowing the means to achieving such 
actions, and possessing the recourses to break free of whatever forces pushing us in the opposite 
direction. We need then to think in terms of what tools may be provided to achieve such a result. 
As with anything, it is not enough to know the goal, if we do not know how to get there. Not 
only, then, must we inquire into the exact ethical rules we should employ, but also into the 
conditions under which such rules are followed. If ethics, most fundamentally, can be seen as 
such a tool for the improvement and management of human conduct, this second part of the 
equation – the question of how – seems at least equally important to the mission of ethics. The 
business of ethics should then consist not only in insisting on its own ethical recommendations, 
but also with inquiring into how ethics may broaden its own field of impact, and in asking how 
people can otherwise be made consistently more liable to choose better. As long as philosophers 
are to be taken seriously about contributing valuable analysis to the environmental cause, they 
must also facilitate the passage from the theoretical down to the practical to close the circuit of 
their contribution.  
Currently, however, ethical theory in environmental philosophy seem only very rarely 
concerned with strategy and its own impact in the world it attempts to influence. Rather it seems 
focused on refining its theories further in a perpetual dispute between relatively small 
theoretical differences (Minteer & Manning, 2000). Admittedly, ethical theoretical differences 
matter, as they pose competing ethical claims. Still, there must also come a time when 
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agreement is sufficient to start common platforms for action and practice. In this particular case, 
time is also an issue. If we are right to question the narrow scope of environmental philosophy's 
perceived mission, as previously argued, then environmental programs should be advised – 
perhaps obligated – to focus less on the theoretical justification of values, and more on the real 
implementation of such values on a systemic and grand scale.  
However, the increasing directness and urgency of the problems appear to be accompanied by 
ever more indirect and abstract approaches in the philosophical discussions, often inclined 
towards wilderness and romanticized ‘typical’ nature as such, but in part downplaying the 
intricate dynamics of the human component and the human-nature relationship to which the 
pathology is universally ascribed.2 After being entrenchments into the myriad of schisms of 
today, this distance to the real physical objects of these theories may only seem greater. The 
concrete issues we face in everyday life, like those of climate change, energy, production, 
sustainable development, species preservation, or animal welfare all seem remote to the 
dealings on this approach, and bonds to any ultimate goal of real life problem-solving may often 
appear to have been broken entirely in today’s debate. The theoretical goals of environmental 
philosophy seem rather to have taken on a life of their own now increasingly disjoined from the 
embedded practical goals of the environmental movement as such. The imperative in 
environmental ethics to refine value theory may seem primary to whether or not real people 
entertain such values. If such claims about it are tenable, it reveals a self-understanding in 
environmental philosophy as self-informed and closed off from the world, rather than the open, 
adjustable and scientifically informed conception previously drawn.  
That the debate has taken this turn away from the applied and concrete at the present moment 
should give reason for concern, as the very problems occasioning the debate in the first place 
seem to intensify with the same rate as the waning of practical philosophical ambition. This 
addressing of real issues through the indirect and abstract is not to say that environmentalism 
is on the decline within philosophy – on the contrary, it is rapidly gaining momentum – but it 
might be growing increasingly internalized and self-contained. If environmental philosophy 
does carry the responsibility to make a difference to the problems with which it is concerned 
its theoretical goals need to be ultimately reducible to practical goals. If the justification of 
                                                 
2 Examples including such authors as J. Callicott, H. Rolston III, T. Ragan,  P. Taylor or A. Næss: ‘Despite the 
variety of positions in environmental ethics developed over the last thirty years, they have focused mainly on 
issues concerned with wilderness and the reasons for its preservation’ (Brennan & Lo, 2011). 
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environmental philosophy is more heavily qualified than other self-justifying fields, it may 
seem that it is failing one of its quintessential tasks, and is once again in need of further 
adaptation to fit the demands of the situation. The previous shift in ethical theory may be called 
a pragmatic one, in the sense that it responded to a discovered hole in the previous models. 
Ethics in the form of environmental ethics adjusted accordingly by supplementing theory to 
accommodate the new non-human inhabitants of the moral community. It seems clear now, 
however, that given the arguably suboptimal protection of environmental philosophy measured 
as its ability for crisis respondence, it seems time for a second update in light of the new 
discoveries thus far, and our experience with the current models. Upon learning that the patients 
of ethics are still inadequately protected in the sense that ethical theory has done little to stop 
environmental destruction, philosophers should once again be prepared to adjust the structure 
of their theories to gain better performance in relation to its objects of protection. Some might 
contend that a certain degree of falsifiability is needed if environmental philosophy should have 
any prospect of improvement. Perhaps philosophers must then be prepared to kill their 
philosophical darlings and proceed designing their theories according to empirical 
correspondence, rather than internal consistency. 
At the same time, however, there are indications that environmental philosophy is approaching 
an end of its juvenile years, and now stabilizing in certain defining ways. Its approaches, though 
initially reacting to the philosophical orthodoxies of the time, are in some ways themselves 
corroborated to orthodoxy, making reorientations progressively difficult. Fixed understandings 
of environmental philosophy’s most recurring themes like intrinsic value and non-
anthropocentrism seem to have become defining to the discipline to the point of some 
theoreticians claiming it a methodological dogmatism (Light & Katz, 1996, p. 2). This fraiming 
seems to lay the premises of the discussions much in the same way that classical pre-
environmental ethics were defined by its canonical themes. As even the starkest dissidents to 
the paradigmatic mainstream will know, few as they are, there is no way around its language 
and concepts, such as the value discussion or the metric of anthropocentrism and non-
anthropocentrism (Weston, 1996a). 
The current swing of the pendulum should come as no surprise. According to Colorado 
professor Katie McShane, the historical backdrop of anthropocentric ethics led many theorists 
to agree with J. Baird Callicott that ‘how to discover intrinsic value in nature is the defining 
problem of environmental ethics’(2009). Similarly, as cited by McShane, Tom Ragan writes: 
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‘Only by meeting these theoretical criteria [of non-anthropocentric inherent value] can we 
arrive at an ethic of the environment, rather than an ethic for the use of the 
environment’(McShane, 2009). These attitudes towards the central task of environmental 
philosophy follow in the tracks of Richard Sylvan (b. Routley) and his challenge to classical 
theory, pointing to the inadequacy of the basic chauvinism princible, i.e of anthropocentrist 
ethics. In his 1973 ‘Last Man example’, which has served a vital role to the formation of 
environmental philosophy in its current form, he outlines the thought experiment of the last 
man on earth, showing how the destruction of the whole world and everything in it would imply 
no moral fault, according to conventional ethics, as long as such destruction poses no adverse 
effects to human beings. The example was effective to show how such an act still conflicts with 
central moral intuitions about the inherent value of nature, intuitions which could not be 
accounted for by way of regular human centered ethics (Sylvan, 2003). Ben Minteer notes: ‘[I]t 
certainly did not take long for the embrace of nonanthropocentrism (and the denunciation of 
moral humanism) to become the default position in environmental ethical writing’ (2006, p. 
191). Examples of today’s main schools in the debate of environmental philosophy and ethics 
such as biocentrism, ecocentrism, or deep ecology, all clearly exemplify this deep affinity with 
ethical non-anthropocentrism and the independent intrinsic value of non-human nature. 
 
In their Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy overview article on environmental ethics, Yeuk-
Sze Lo and Andrew Brennan include some remarks on these paradigmatic features of 
environmental philosophy: 
 
‘[These] theories all seem to have one view in common: that anthropocentrism is at the heart of the 
problem of environmental destructiveness. If anthropocentrism is the problem, then perhaps non-
anthropocentrism is the solution’(2011).  
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They proceed to identify two central tenants of modern environmental philosophy:  
 
(1) «The evaluative thesis of non-anthropocentrism», which is «the claim that natural non-
human things have intrinsic value, i.e. value in their own right independent of any use 
they have for others».  
(2) «The psycho-behavioural thesis of non-anthropocentrism» which is the often unspoken 
assumption that «people who believe in the evaluative thesis of non-anthropocentrism 
are more likely to behave environmentally […] than those who do not» (Brennan & Lo, 
2011).   
 
Given these assumptions of contemporary environmental philosophy, the conclusion seems to 
follow that we should promote the case of non-anthropocentrism in order to counteract the 
destructive behaviours informed and caused by anthropocentrism. However, if either of these 
assumptions would prove in any way vulnerable, so seems the whole edifice built upon its 
structure: And predictably, according to increasing objections from some critics in the field, 
they are.  
On the first assumption of environmental ethics, some emerging theorists like Bryan Norton, 
Andrew Light or Ben Minteer, argue that the indispensability ascribed to the notion of intrinsic 
value is not necessarily justified given what the notion is invoked to accomplish. Suspicions 
against its necessity or even usefulness in the literature, seen as a provider of justification to 
environmental protection and caution, is further increased by the lack of a unified and clear 
operational conception, as unravelling ontological and epistemological discussions continue to 
obscure its exact content. According to authors such Anthony Weston, ascribing the lead role 
in environmental ethics to these seemingly straightforward notions has inadvertently caused 
their theoretical content to expand through the long technical debates, increasing their distance 
to their first spontaneous uncomplicated sense. Several problems with their role as moral 
grounding for environmental philosophy has then arisen.  
Firstly, according to Weston, the precise sense of intrinsic value (and thus also of non-
anthropocentrism which depends upon it) is unclear as it is filled with varying, and highly 
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specific metaphysical content throughout the literature, even though it is often taken as 
fundamental and unproblematic (Weston, 1996a, p. 287). Secondly, it fails in either case to 
capture the differences in real acts of valuing, and can rarely be applied informatively to 
particular people or instances. It should be safe to claim that individuals very rarely will invoke 
unambiguously anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric justifications for their actions, as they 
are very rarely informed by such abstract and systematic moral principles. Rather we are likely 
to find they entertain a variety of moral intuitions that are not necessarily reducible to any 
particular set of academically formalized ethics. If real-life moral processes are ill captured by 
theory, conceptions of moral relationships as built upon idealized conceptions of human agency 
could be problematic. In analyzing the moral relationships that hold between two parts, both 
parts must be accurately captured for conclusions to be true. If they are not, we must argue that 
the theories are in a bad position to enable better practices – even if evaluative statements 
regarding one part are correct.  
As an extension of this, we might find that the very concepts of anthropocentrism and non-
anthropocentrism in themselves must be modified from being seen as sharply contrasted and 
mutually distinguishable, to being seen with soft edges and as coming in degrees. If the literal 
sense of anthropocentrism really implies denying any type of human independent value in non-
human entities whatsoever, we easily end up in extreme absurdities that apply to none of the 
intended targets. Arguably, very few fit the description ‘anthropocentrist’ if taken as total moral 
disregard for non-human interest (who would be willing to torture animals, say). When as many 
as 97 % of responders in an American survey consider themselves animal lovers, L. Pippa 
Callanan argues that ‘Americans nearly universally attribute intrinsic value to the nonhuman 
world’ (2010).  Equally very few fit the description ‘non-anthropocentrist’ if taken as equal 
moral regard for humans as to non-humans that possess moral standing. Even Paul Taylor’s 
radical egalitarian biocentrism seems do dissolve under this view if taken in the extreme as 
meaning that human inherent worth is equal to, and deserve the same moral protection as that 
of say mosquitoes or tulips. Such views on the absolute requirements of a non-anthropocentrism 
(which, to be clear, do exist) may at times seem to lend themselves to other radical movements 
such as ‘Earth First!’ or some of its members, like radical Finish naturalist Pentii Linkola 
advocating ‘rapid population decline’ and environmental genocide. Deontological views are 
known to collapse under extreme consequences, meaning that their absolutist aspirations, just 
as the categorical understanding of the difference between anthropocentrism, and non-
anthropocentrism might be dismissed first hand. This means that anthropocentrism, if it should 
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be meaningful, must apply to some people even if they admit some inherent value to non-human 
entities, and non-anthropocentrism must be granted to some people who deny that humans have 
equal moral significance as non-humans. But then where goes the line? Even Paul Taylor, 
despite his denial of human superiority, has devised an intricate system of principles for 
resolving conflicts of interest which utilizes both a wide and human-favoring notion of what it 
means to have ‘basic interests’ and the right to take other life on the grounds of ‘self 
subsistence’. If he admits ever being willing to prioritize the life of a human being over the life 
of any non-human being, it seems he has conceded that his non-anthropocentrism is not in fact 
absolute in ascribing equal ‘worth’ to one as the other  (cf. Taylor, 2011, pp. 129, 256–280). 
Further, as the content of non-anthropocentrism is philosophically complex and unclear in its 
own right, largely committed to the particular understanding of intrinsic value employed, 
Anthony Weston makes the case that the line between anthropocentrism and non-
anthropocentrism is more blurred and problematic than often assumed (Weston, 1996a).  
Firstly, as the seemingly clear-cut distinction is investigated, he finds that there are many term 
‘anthropocentism’ is more ambiguous than what is previously assumed (Norton, 2003, p. 164). 
The core notion of ‘human centeredness’ as such is more ambiguous as usually assumed, as 
also pointed out by Eugene Hargrove who claims anthropocentrism simply means ‘human 
centered’ or ‘seeing from the standpoint of a human being’ (Hargrove, 2003, p. 175). We see 
that ‘centeredness’ as such may have a number of possible meanings, for instance (1) that all 
entities within a defined border of values have intrinsic value and moral standing, and none 
outside of it do, which is the most common understanding. (2) That the center of value is where 
values are the strongest, although there may be weaker values outside the center. (3) That the 
value of entities outside the center of value are derived from their resemblance to those inside 
the circle. (4) The descriptive notion that any understanding of value presupposes a point of 
view from which hermeneutical interpretation of other values must begin (without demanding 
such values be fundamentally similar). 
. d also problems connected to the fact that non-anthropocentrism inherently takes its very 
meaning from its proclaimed opposite, being inherently defined through the same conceptual 
framework as that which it seeks to abolish, something which would seem to tie the two closer 
together, rather than disconnecting them (Weston, 1996a, p. 143). Even to those harboring 
strong affiliations to Taylor’s respect for nature and who spontaneously identify with the same 
humility as non-anthropocentrists in their repulsion toward the typical human chauvinism 
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towards nature, may find that the notion of strong egalitarianism and equal inherent worth 
between, say, mosquitoes and human beings is by all accounts morally absurd. Such a position 
may sound equally extreme and unreal as one which offers absolutely no moral considerability 
to the suffering of any non-human animal or to the massive annihilation of species or 
ecosystems whatsoever. Kelly Parker apply puts this point thus: ‘Blind anthropocentrism has 
deplorable consequences for the non-human world, but a blindly misanthropic ecocentrism is 
no less deplorable’ (1996, p. 33). If we can allow such reservations as mentioned above in a 
non-antropocentric view, we must further ask the question of how much inequality we may fit 
before tipping the scale. Norton famously suggests instead that a ‘week anthropocentrism’ may 
well take the place of non-anthropocentrism as an ‘adequate environmental ethic’ (Norton, 
2003). In any case, as Hargrove argues; as long as human beings are doing the valuing, we are 
inextricably trapped in a human-centered ethic in so far as we are exercising our valuing of 
nature form a human point of view. Epistemologically, then, it will be impossible to extract the 
human element from ethics sufficiently to qualify as a truly ‘nature centered’ ethic. 
 
The second assumption of environmental ethics, the assumption of the behavioural thesis, 
authors like Anders Biel hold that this is far too simplistic a model of human moral behaviour. 
According to such critics, the approach of the psycho-behavioural thesis commits to the long 
replaced belief-desire model of action, which reveals an obsolete idea of the complex 
psychological and social dynamics underpinning environmental action and moral belief. Many 
philosophers and interdisciplinary scholars as for example Biel, Murray Bookchin or Slavoj 
Zizek call for such large scale institutional perspectives in determining the systemics of 
environmental behaviour. If moving focus from the individual normative level to the societal 
descriptive level, we may avoid the moral reductionisms of understanding behaviour purely in 
terms of conscious free willed moral action. Norton raises concerns that anthropocentrism 
within this frame is only part of the problem, or even perhaps merely a symptom of it, and that 
even if it were the real source, environmental philosophers are not approaching it correctly in 
order to change it.  
 
In this thesis I wish to engage this discussion through an investigation of two of the main 
exponents of such criticisms – the first being known as environmental pragmatism, and the 
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second what I will refer to as environmental systematism. The chapter on environmental 
pragmatism answers largely to the evaluative thesis through its discussions of inherent value, 
and its necessity in the debate. The chapter on systematism answers to the psycho-behavioural 
thesis, and expounds on some of its problematic features as a fundamental background of 
popular conclusions in environmental philosophy, seen from a psychological and system 
oriented perspective. Ultimately, I wish to show that both assumptions of environmental 
philosophy are untenable and that environmental philosophy needs to reorient itself insofar as 
it is based upon the two assumptions. as bearers of the philosophical approach, and that 
environmental debate should in order to becomme practically feasible and consistent with the 
major discoveries of empirical research.  
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 Environmental pragmatism 
Common ethical platforms based on knowledge and agreement 
 
2.1 What is environmental pragmatism? 
Apart from the environmental thinking of the early pragmatists such as John Dewey, 
environmental pragmatism is a recently appearing position, that took form in the 1990s 
following seminal papers written by Anthony Weston (1996b) and Andrew Light . It has 
secured a few, but prominent supporters such as Bryan Norton, Kelly Parker, Peter Wenz, Mark 
Sagoff, Ben Minteer and others, who have been decisive to shaping the movement under a 
common banner. Inspired by the American pragmatist tradition, it seeks to steer discussions in 
environmental philosophy in more practically oriented, and less theoretically confined 
directions. They have argued that after over 50 years of intense but seemingly ineffectual work 
on the part of environmentalism and environmental philosophy, the time has come to raise the 
question of whether their impact can be improved, and to reassess the way the topic is 
approached so that more results can be seen in terms of concrete and effective behavioural and 
political change. Therefore, they conclude that environmental philosophers need to ask what 
would be adequate to a workable and realistic ethic that may plausibly be applied and adopted 
on a large scale, rather than attempt to achieve philosophical certainty. In their pioneering 1996 
anthology on environmental pragmatism, Andrew Light and Eric Katz quote Mark Sagoff, 
saying:  
[We] have to get on without certainty; we have to solve practical, not theoretical problems; and we must 
adjust the ends we pursue to the means available to accomplish them. Otherwise, method becomes an 
obstacle to morality, dogma the foe of deliberation, and the ideal society we aspire to in theory will 
become a formidable enemy of the good society we can achieve in fact. (Light & Katz, 1996, p. 2) 
 
Its proponents maintain that environmental philosophy and ethics should reassess its role to the 
outside world and its concrete environmental problems, and regain a sense of the materiality 
and concreteness of the issues that first sparked environmental philosophical debate. They 
channel the worry of many environmental philosophers that philosophy is growing increasingly 
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irrelevant to environmental polity or social action (Minteer, 2006, p. 2). Therefore, they wish 
in various ways to redefine the goals of the movement as informed by the problems of the 
precarious environmental situation, rather than to elaborate further on intricate sets of 
theoretical subtleties in a debate that seems mostly of interest only to philosophers in the field. 
In the words of Ben Minteer it is the ‘choosing policy pragmatism over philosophical purity, 
democracy over dogma, and impact over ideology’ (2012, p. 3). Analogous to the function of 
other applied disciplines like medical ethics, business ethics or engineering ethics, 
environmental ethics should also be mounted on a principle of practical application so that it 
can be used to better understand and manage the particular dynamics and processes within its 
field of inquiry. As we move deeper into the 21st century, the importance and justification of 
the field should be increasingly placed with its status as a tool in addressing increasingly acute 
environmental issues, a role we should see trumping philosophical and intellectual functions, 
however much merit they have in themselves.  
One of the main reasons for the introduction of pragmatism in environmental philosophy, 
according to Anthony Weston, is to address what he calls the abstractness of the current 
theoretical landscape of values.(Weston, 1996b, p. 288) Like their namesake and ancestor in 
American pragmatism, environmental pragmatists argue that the function of theory is not 
ultimately to model objective reality or attain metaphysical ‘truth’, but rather to act as a tool for 
practise and precise problem solving. It picks up an instrumental approach to ethical theory in 
following William James stating that ‘Theories thus become instruments, not answers to 
enigmas in which we can rest’(1907, Lecture II). The pragmatic notion of truth, as James quotes 
Peirce, advocates an understanding of ‘belief’ as primarily ‘rules for action’ and ‘truth’ as the 
answer to the question: ‘In what respects would the world be different [to us] if this alternative 
or that is true?’ (James, 1907, Lecture II).  
Many of the differences in today’s debate are in fact not traceable in differences of action, 
neither politically, socially nor consumptively, argue environmental pragmatists.3 Thus 
pragmatists stress the primacy of practise over theory, invoking the classical pragmatist notion 
of truth as regarding the primary content of theory in terms of its practical impact in the world 
if it were true, and dismissing metaphysical speculation without the potential to make a 
difference to possible experience. In rejecting the traditional philosophical quest for truth in its 
regular sense, they take to what they consider the more relevant question of function. Stressing 
                                                 
3 More on this in 2.5 on Bryan Norton’s convergence hypothesis. 
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that the real measure of scientific or philosophical success is not the internal rigidity, cf. ‘truth’ 
of its theoretical content, but how well its theory makes accurate predictions and enables 
efficiency in bringing about its declared goals.  
 
This new group under the label environmental pragmatism accordingly sets out to criticize 
conventional approaches to ‘environmental philosophy for its lack of practical orientation as an 
applied discipline. They often engage not in the concrete philosophical arguments of most 
environmental philosophers, as conventionally addressing their internal philosophical qualities 
to ask whether or not they are true, but takes a meta-philosophical stance to critique the very 
framing in which such arguments are made. They conclude that the focus of their inquiry should 
lie elsewhere, given that a major premise of its existence is the onset of the environmental crisis, 
and that it should not consider itself a detached and disinterested theoretical discipline to be 
extricated and matured over long periods of time in the same manner as most other fields of 
philosophy.4 Pragmatists promote pluralistic, interdisciplinary and empirical approaches in the 
attempt to overcome the perceived stagnation suffered by environmental programs. They wish 
to strive for a focused unity in the efforts of environmental philosophers, rather than the self-
defeating entrenched battles over practically insignificant nuances and fixed ideological 
fundamentals, encouraging representatives of different views rather to join in cooperation 
directing their energy outwards rather than at each other regarding pressing environmental 
concerns. Environmental pragmatism is the worry that most environmentalists or any other 
audience may find it difficult to get involved in, let alone to endorse the specific abstract 
contents of modern philosophical theories of non-instrumental natural value. However, it argues 
that it should not throw the baby out with the bathwater, but rather keep others included, even 
if uninformed on, or reluctant towards, specific theories of value. 
 
Among the key strategies of environmental pragmatists lies in this pluralism that seeks to 
identify what unifies environmentalists rather than what divides them, and promoting a 
focussed and coordinated pursuit of common goals. Minteer and Manning state how the 
movement emerged resulting from the limits of moral monism: ‘[a] growing number of 
                                                 
4 Indeed some argue that environmental philosophers need not be normatively motivated by interests in 
environmental causes at all, but they may be regarded a marginal group. (Cf. Laplante, 2004) 
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environmental ethicists have become dissatisfied with the limits of monistic philosophy as the 
paradigmatic operating mode in the field.’(Minteer & Manning, 2003, p. 319) 
 
An important part of the unifying efforts of pragmatic pluralism relies on questioning the 
validity of common dividing theoretical dichotomies. Environmental pragmatists often argue 
that the classical abstract distinctions made in environmental theory seldom answer sufficiently 
to the real and dynamic objects in the real world that such abstractions are meant to model. 
They point out that the distinction between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, for 
instance, a distinction made absolutely fundamental to the proceedings of environmental ethics, 
oftentimes appears less protruding when projected onto people in the real world. Norton 
expresses best such reluctance to fuel the common schisms and dichotomies created by 
theoretical abstractions:  
[T]he book is sceptical of grand dichotomies, which are so often the fellow-travelers of intuitive, a priori 
knowledge. Grand dichotomies, as John Dewey recognized at the turn of this century, thrive only in ivory 
towers; when held up against the real world, they do not fit, and are tumbled about and scratched. 
Underneath, one usually finds a continuum with an oversimplification superimposed. (1994, preface; 
x) 
Environmental pragmatists often suggest that the framing of the environmental crisis within 
contemporary non-anthropocentric models takes an overly simplified or polarized form. Most 
environmental philosophers frame the mission of the field in breaking with the previously 
anthropocentric paradigm in ethics, arguing that the task is to overturn what is still the default 
morality throughout most of the world. However, environmental pragmatists wish to challenge 
the notion of anthropocentrism as a valid description for the applicability of this grand 
dichotomy between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism as an absolute divide of all 
possible moral attitudes towards nature. There seems to be two questions that need affirmative 
answering before anthropocentrism warrants its current role in the debate. Firstly, can we define 
anthropocentrism sharply in contrast to non-anthropocentrism, and second, do most people in 
that case really fall into this category, such that the non-anthropocentric appeal hits the intended 
mark? The pragmatist answer is that the category is ill-defined, and that even if it were not, 
most people would likely not fit the description like it is intended.  
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Environmental pragmatists like Weston argue that the dichotomy is false, and reductive in 
relation to the vast diversity and complexity of real moral attitudes (1996b). If positions5 and 
attitudes are diverse and irreducible to a single consistent and unified attitude, as Weston 
suggests, then in practise most people would seldom come out at one determinate point or the 
other on the question of anthropocentrism. Even if based against the most naïve criteria of 
admitting some sort of independent value in nature, we will likely find that most people 
minimally fulfil the criteria in one way or another already in valuing nature for its own sake. If 
this is the case, the theoretical map does not fit with the landscape and the models applied 
should be recalibrated. Arguably, very few people across the world will think that harming or 
inflicting pain to animals unnecessarily is morally permissible, or that the richness and diversity 
of living species in themselves are completely outside the domain of moral considerability. We 
my for instance note how many nations (although not enough) have already passed animal rights 
or welfare legislation, such as in Norway, where it is asserted that ‘animals have intrinsic value 
independently of human instrumental value’6 (“Dyrevelferdsloven § 3,” 2009). However, if 
most people are mostly anthropocentric in their valuations of nature (or at least in their 
unconditional priority of human over non-human interests) the naïve criteria does not seem to 
be enough to capture what is meant, and the distinction must be qualified further to capture the 
intended sense. However, some priority to human over non-human interests is normally 
permissible within non-anthropocentric systems. Profound respect and non-instrumental 
valuing of nature is still not only possible, but highly prevalent both amongst those who are 
uninformed by value theory, or even those who disagree with non-anthropocentric monistic 
theories of value in nature.  
A hallmark of many of these theorists is also to cast doubt around the a priori approaches with 
which environmental philosophy has been conducted, as is particularly visible in the scepticism 
around the fortified position of value-theory and the anthropocentrism in today. As inspired 
from the classical pragmatists such as William James, a prominent feature of environmental 
pragmatism is its empirical feature. Alongside its pluralistic aspirations which call for mutual 
interdisciplinary collaboration, a salient aspect of such collaboration must take place on 
empirical grounds in the mutual exchange of information informing of related sciences in most 
                                                 
5 ‘Positions’ is a fairly ambitious term to apply to laypeople across the world, as ‘pre-reflective dormant 
intuitions or attitudes’ of varying theoretical consistency and strength is probably more accurate. 
6 My translation. 
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accurately and scientifically capturing the mechanics of environmental processes, and the 
nature of human environmental detrimental behaviour.  
 
2.2 Historical roots 
As the constitution and unity of 20th century pragmatism is a wide and difficult topic in its own 
right, the business of fleshing out baselines for an environmental pragmatism of the 21st century 
would seem to be complicated further, as it takes its inspiration from a vast and uncharted line 
of intellectual history. This might occasion a proper glance at environmental pragmatism in its 
historical context and the proprietary ideas of its predecessors. As pointed out in the preface of 
Light and Katz' 1996 anthology on environmental pragmatism, the current developments and 
discussions in the field originate from a broad spectrum of philosophical perspectives. They 
claimed in 1996 that environmental pragmatism has emerged in at least four forms, which is 
now almost twenty years ago (Light & Katz, 1996, p. 5). This is much in tune with the generic 
pluralism of pragmatism, even if pragmatists (such as Norton in particular (1994)) often stress 
the importance of unity and a common platform in developing effective environmental 
solutions. It seems that even if pluralism is among the key elements of pragmatism, a large 
degree of controversy regarding its role still subsists. Whether or not these two elements are 
contradictory will not be dealt with here, but suffice it to say that the label of ‘environmental 
pragmatism’ is a dramatically diverse term, drawing its inspiration from an unruly intellectual 
territory. In fact, Light and Katz believe that ‘environmental pragmatism as such is primarily a 
strategy for approaching environmental philosophy and environmental issues – it more 
accurately refers to a cluster of related and overlapping concepts, rather than to a single view’ 
(Light & Katz, 1996, p. 5). In this respect, it reflects a diversity seen in many other lines of 
thought that are collected under a common name merely by virtue of family likeness, rather 
than through the minimal set of shared features of a pre-defined program. If, as for instance Ben 
Minteer argues, environmental pragmatism is defined through its common inspiration by the 
American pragmatists, it suffices to point out that such a point of reference is also not a fixed 
point as it in many respects is as diverse as the position to be defined in the first place. Such a 
lack of defined unity is sometimes seen as a sign of immaturity in the literature, most explicitly 
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by Bryan Norton7, assuming it to evolve towards ever greater agreement and internal 
consistency, rather than to expand further in increasingly diverse directions. Regardless of its 
development, however, whether diverging or converging, its firmest common denominator 
today is likely found in its historical roots in classical pragmatism. 
 
The exposition of historical roots for one philosophy based on another must naturally take a 
two-part turn – one dealing with the history of the philosophy at hand, and one dealing with the 
philosophy upon which the first one is based.  
 
2.2.1 American pragmatism  
The typical story about pragmatism famously takes place in the United States of America, 
particularly following the works of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), William James (1842-
1910), and John Dewey (1859-1952). The term ‘pragmatism’ caries etymological linkage to 
words like ‘practice’ and ‘practical’ and derives from the Greek πραγμα (pragma), translatable 
to ’action’ or ‘fact’ (“Pragmatism,” n.d., “πρᾶγμα,” 2013), hence the philosophy’s emphasis on 
matters of practice over those of theory. The pragmatic maxim, as it was later named was 
originally formulated by Peirce in his Popular Science Monthly article titled ‘How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear’ from 1878, but never took hold until being reintroduced by James in 1898, 
according to James (1907, Lecture II). The famous formulation of Peirce’ maxim reads:   
‘Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our 
conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.’ 
(Peirce, 1878, p. 293) 
As among the pillars of pragmatism, belief and truth are, according to James most essentially 
principles of successful conduct in the world, and represents the attitudes towards the world 
which will prove the most successful guidance of action. Truth, in this picture, is those beliefs 
people ought to hold in order to sustain successful conduct. Thus inquiry, as a goal directed 
teleological conduct receives its normative qualities. It contains an element of desire or want, 
                                                 
7 ‘[O]riginary stages are the worst possible times at which to demand that we all speak with one voice. Once a 
set of values is culturally consolidated, it may well be possible, perhaps even necessary, to reduce them to some 
kind of consistency.’ (cited in: Light & Katz, 1996, p. 5) 
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in attempting to discover true propositions. Truth as a normative notion is inherently bound to 
action, dictating the correct or successful attitudes towards the world which ought to be held. 
Truth performs the linkage between the believer and the world around him or her in which he 
or she acts.  
 
James’ series of lectures entitled Pragmatism – A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking 
appeared in print in 1907, follows his lectures on pragmatism at Lowell Institute and Columbia 
University. The pluralistic subtitle immediately brings forth the context of historical continuity 
which is sought for here. James humbly notes how  
‘[t]here is absolutely nothing new in the pragmatic method. Socrates was an adept at it. Aristotle used it 
methodically. Locke, Berkeley and Hume made momentous contributions to truth by its means.’ (James, 
1907, Lecture II)  
James describes pragmatism as a type of unification between a deep chasm in philosophy that 
has existed ever since ancient times, and runs deep between the called ‘soft’ and ‘hard 
temperaments’ of philosophers. The first, he explains, tends to be 'rationalistic, idealistic, 
optimistic, religious, free-willist, monistic, and dogmatical', 8  whereas the other is ‘empiricist, 
sensationalistic, materialistic, pessimistic, irreligious, fatalistic, pluralistic, and sceptical’ 
(James, 1907, Lecture I). James finds that this division is historically epitomized in empiricism 
and rationalism respectively. However, the likeness of which might be just as easily recognized 
between the idealism of Plato versus the realism of Aristotle, or as notoriously known today as 
the rift between so called analytic and continental philosophy. Standing within an empiricist (or 
analytical) tradition himself, James recognizes the unsatisfying character of both extremes in 
want of the other; how, bluntly '[e]mpiricism gives facts without religion' and 'Rationalism 
gives religion without facts' (James, 1907, Contents). Thus James wishes to formulate 
pragmatism as a mediating system between the two, synthesizing their virtues in a case sensitive 
and refined form. 
The theoretical pluralism which is introduced by James is the attempt to maintain several 
perspectives where they function best or is most successfully applied: 
                                                 
8 As we shall later see, these characterizations are the exact same that environmental pragmatists use to describe 
mainstream environmental thought, cf. Light and Katz’ question of ‘theoretical dogmatism’ (1996, p. 2) 
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Most of us have a hankering for the good things on both sides of the line. Facts are good, of course—give 
us lots of facts. Principles are good—give us plenty of principles. The world is indubitably one if you 
look at it in one way, but as indubitably is it many, if you look at it in another. It is both one and many—
let us adopt a sort of pluralistic monism. Everything of course is necessarily determined, and yet of course 
our wills are free: a sort of free-will determinism is the true philosophy. (James, 1907, Lecture I) 
 
Diverging descriptions of the same may simultaneously be true under different conditions. 
Thus, in the spirit of Peirce's essay ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ (1878), James hopes that 
many apparently irresolvable conundrums of philosophy may prove to dissolve under the 
correct application of perspective. Illustrating with an example, he notes how he was once asked 
to settle a metaphysical dispute concerning a squirrel hiding behind the stem of a tree and a man 
moving around it trying to see it. When asked whether the man really moved around the squirrel, 
James explains how the answer should depend on the practical sense of 'moving around':  
If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the 
north of him again, obviously the man does go round him, for he occupies these successive positions. But 
if on the contrary you mean being first in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on 
his left, and finally in front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go round him, for by the 
compensating movements the squirrel makes, he keeps his belly turned towards the man all the time, and 
his back turned away (1907, Lecture II) 
 
This problem solving and problem dissolving character of philosophy is clearly recognizable 
in the approach of the later environmental pragmatists. 
 
 
2.2.2 Beginnings of environmental pragmatism 
 
A historical contextualization of environmental pragmatism should perhaps start with a due 
disclaimer to avoid any impression of a clear continuous heritage from American pragmatism. 
Although the ideas of particular pragmatists are often adopted by environmental pragmatists, 
environmental pragmatism is not, unlike for instance neo-pragmatism, built upon any particular 
cannon or philosopher, and stands in no direct continuous relation or allegiance to classical 
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pragmatism besides identifying it as the most proper name for their own independent attitudes 
towards environmental philosophy. Its proponents are firstly environmental philosophers, 
exploring pragmatic ideas, rather than pragmatists exploring environmental philosophy. It is 
true that some of these attitudes and fundamental intuitions stand in close relation to those 
attitudes of the original movement, pragmatism thus developed against the background of 
current trends in environmental philosophy is quite different from the background of 
pragmatism at the turn of the last century. As the two started off initially with answering quite 
different questions to begin with, one might argue that the resemblance of their answers in the 
end are only coincidental. Philosophical concerns that drove classical pragmatists, as for 
instance theories of truth, metaphysics, language or logic are not necessarily relevant to the 
philosophical projects of environmental pragmatists, stressing the importance of practicality 
and non-redundancy in achieving successful analysis of environmental issues.  
For this reason it might rather be regarded an applied instance of select pragmatic principles, as 
it (rather pragmatically) picks out the components that best fits these environmental needs. Even 
Peirce himself was skeptical of the notion that philosophy should become practical understood 
as getting involved in current political and social issues (Bernstein, 1972, p. 201). For one, the 
coinage of a pragmatic approach to environmental philosophy arose in reaction to the particular 
form of the dominant monistic non-instrumentalist approaches. It seems clear their motivations 
differ: Environmental philosophers wanted to solve environmental problems, whereas classical 
pragmatists wanted to analyze the workings of science and philosophy. If asking environmental 
pragmatists how they feel about general philosophical questions aside from environmentalism, 
they may not give pragmatist answers at all. There is no necessary contradiction between 
environmental pragmatism and, say, and the notion of absolute reality and coresponcance 
theory of truth, although this would be in conflict with classical pragmatism.  
 
A concrete ‘beginning’ of environmental pragmatism as a collective movement is perhaps hard 
to pinpoint. Several currents which more or less resemble a pragmatism in the environmental 
enquiry, can be seen at various points in the literature. For instance the deep ecology movement 
and the writings of Arne Næss display several pragmatic features, such as holism, pluralism, 
non-fundamentalism and underscoring a looser practice based notion of ethics mounting on 
situatedness and lifestyle rather than hard moral absolutism (Næss, 1989). Næss’ connections 
to the logical empiricist movement during the 1940s, onwards, a movement sometimes 
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considered a philosophical descendant of pragmatism equally sceptical to the practical 
relevance of metaphysics, further show this relatedness, and how it may be hard to specify the 
precise boundaries of pragmatism in western philosophical thought. The subtitle of William 
James’ Pragmatism, reading ‘A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking’ (1907) goes to 
make the same point for classical pragmatism, namely that the currents of pragmatism span 
well beyond their historical fixation in a defined philosophical school. However, as an explicit 
philosophical position (or perhaps better, movement) on the environmental scene, 
environmental pragmatism has arisen from a few select works and authors within the past 30 
years.  
According to Clare Palmer, the term ‘environmental pragmatism’ was first employed by 
Andrew Light in 1992, following a longer independent opting by Antony Weston to adopt a 
‘pragmatic approach’ to environmental ethics in 1985 (Palmer, 2003, p. 32). The literature on 
the topic has expanded considerably after circa 2005 and onwards, but a few seminal works and 
authors should be mentioned, such as the 1996 environmental pragmatism anthology edited by 
Andrew Light and Eric Katz, which is frequently cited in the literature and helped establish the 
term as a recognized position or movement. Anthony Weston, however, is by most considered 
the father of environmental pragmatism as a movement, in the wake of whom many renowned 
authors such as Andrew Light, Bryan Norton, Anthony Weston, Kelly Parker, Ben Minteer, 
Katie McShane or Kristin Schrader-Frechette have all since made considerable contributions.  
 
According to Light and Katz, in their 1996 anthology, environmental pragmatism has emerged 
in at least four forms:  
1. ‘Examinations into the connections between classical American philosophical pragmatism and 
environmental issues; 
2. The articulation of practical strategies for bridging gaps between environmental theorists, policy analysts, 
activists, and the public; 
3. Theoretical investigations into the overlapping normative basis of specific environmental organizations 
and movements, for the purposes of providing grounds for the convergence of activists on policy choices; 
and among these theoretical debates; 
4. General arguments for theoretical and meta-theoretical moral pluralism in environmental normative 
theory.’(Light & Katz, 1996, p. 5) 
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These categories are not firm distinctions and are not elaborated upon in Light and Katz’ 
introduction in order to establish a taxonomical system between different approaches. This is 
also not their intent, as is later made clear. Rather they wish to provide some overview of the 
most frequent themes appearing in the literature. Many more categories could have been 
included in the anthology, particularly now, almost 20 years after the anthology’s publication. 
Such might include the meta-philosophical and meta-ethical investigations into the purposes 
and boundaries of philosophical inquiry; attempts to realign philosophical theorizing with 
empirical knowledge, and sciences such as moral psychology, sociology, ecology and politics. 
There are a large degree of difference also among self-declared environmental pragmatists and 
their emphasis in the debate. Some, like Norton, describe themselves as anthropocentrists 
(2003), some stress the application of methods from classical pragmatists (Minteer, 2012), some 
are concened with moving beyond intrinsic value debates and some are preoccupied with 
developing pragmatic notions of value (Moriarty, 2006). The literature on environmental 
pragmatism is no doubt diverse and clearly filled with tensions if it is to be understood and 
analyzed as a single project. We can therefore understand why Light and Katz warn against 
reading their 1996 anthology as a ‘prolegomena to the full development of a coherent normative 
position in the field of environmental philosophy’ (Light & Katz, 1996, p. 15). Rather, as is 
previously indicated, the category is perhaps best understood through family resemblance rather 
than an absolute set of shared properties. There is even seems to be mixed opinions among 
environmental pragmatists as to whether or not they should try to agree more, or whether or 
this diversity should be regarded good to the health of the field in its own right. When for 
instance Bryan Norton advocates bringing environmental philosophers theoretically closer, and 
moving ‘towards unity among environmentalists’, as is the title of his book, this may be 
contrary to other proponents of pluralism who see theoretical diversity as a benefit to a healthy 
movement.  
 
However, the de-polarizing and unifying feature of classical pragmatism is perhaps the most 
common feature of is one that is often reiterated by modern environmental pragmatism, as for 
instance by Bryan Norton’s attempt to bring unity to environmentalism (1994), or Ben 
Minteer’s so called ‘third way’ in environmental ethics (2006), bridging a different gap between 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ thinking, namely that between conservationism and preservationism, or the 
polarized anthropocentric vs. non-anthropocentric approaches (Minteer, 2006, p. 1). 
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As noted previously, one core element of pragmatism remains the abandonment of 
metaphysical speculation in the search for truth.9 With environmental pragmatists, the question 
of truth is abandoned, not because they reject truth as a fruitful concept in itself, like the classical 
pragmatists do, but because they contend that the quest for truth happens to stands in the way 
of more important goals in the particular field of environmentalism. In the case of classical 
pragmatism, however, truth is abandoned not because it contingently disrupts a project 
disjoined from it, but because of the philosophical desire to dissolve intellectual knots that were 
beyond the reach of regular rational or empirical cognition. If environmental pragmatists did 
not happen to perceive the truth notion as standing in the way, rather than aiding their project 
of dissolving environmental problems, many would arguably have little problem with it. In this 
way, environmental pragmatists are merely cherry-picking from the school of pragmatism, 
using only that which works, pragmatically enough, for the particular purposes, and recognizing 
that an applied pragmatism in any other field could look quite different given its different goals 
and initial conditions.  
 
2.3 What is the question of environmental 
philosophy? 
 
The environmental debate in philosophy stretches further back in the history of philosophy than 
what can probably be accurately accounted for. A rudimentary discussion of value in nature is 
arguably seen for instance in Aristotle’s teleological concept of virtue according to the self-
realization of one’s form (Kraut, 2014). This concept notably extends not only to human virtues 
but also those of every living thing which are a ‘teleological center of a life’ as Paul Taylor 
would call it today (2011). 
Environmental pragmatists like Minteer and Light argure that given the time that this search for 
value was begun, it seems likely that its motivational cue is connected with the appearance and 
discovery of environmental problems. There seems to be a strong causal link between the 
sudden surge of attention devoted to material environmental concerns, such as pollution, 
                                                 
9As understood traditionally by the correspondence theory of truth. Pragmatists do search for ‘truth’ but in the  
often employ the pragmatic theory of truth as previously quoted by James.  
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insustainability, and mass-extinctions, and the sudden desire for an environmental philosophy. 
It is very difficult to imagine an environmental philosophy booming in such a rapid and sudden 
fashion at any other time in history, suggesting that the emergence of wide and serious practical 
environmental challenges constituted the triggering point. such as sustainability and  of  and It 
might be that the project of environmental ethics has since changed, or was never unified in the 
first place. After all, there are no binding normative directives, or clearly defined goals within 
the movement. However, as for instance Andrew Light argues, the very historical reason that a 
pervasive recognition of inherent value in nature was so desperately needed at the was the fact 
that without it humans would seem even more psychologically bent on the path to destroying 
nature.  
 
‘My rationale is this: If the original reason that philosophers established this field was to make a 
philosophical contribution to the resolution of environmental problems (consistent with other 
professionals’ response to environmental concerns in the early 1970s), then the continuation – indeed the 
urgency – of those problems demands that philosophers do all they can to actually help change present 
policies and attitudes involving environmental problems. If we talk only to each other about value theory, 
we have failed as environmental professionals.’ (Light, 2003, p. 399)  
 
 If this is the case, a short circuit may have been made from the strong instrumental role of this 
search to its adoption as the sole purpose of environmental philosophy itself. Naturally, 
however, no argument from whatever motivations were drawn upon in the past can be applied 
as justification for the goals philosophers ought to be pursuing today. If anything, such 
arguments usually serve the exact opposite, as demonstration of obsolescence and need for fresh 
thinking. Nevertheless, if the environmental philosophers in the past were indeed differently 
minded and with different implicit goals, a silent turn must have taken place sometime during 
the last decades, where what came to be known as 'environmental philosophy' no longer meant 
the resolution oriented philosophical treatment of  questions of sustainability, ecological 
harmony or consumption management, but rather a metaphysical inquiry of nature philosophy. 
If this is the case, it seems like the former endeavour was unnoticeably left fallow, while its 
questions, under the guise of being vigorously debated, in fact remained unanswered.  
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The reactions to these sorts of compromising positions are diverse. Firstly there seems to be 
something unsettling about the seemingly consequentialist abandonment of environmental 
values in the hopes that more can be achieved without them. Something is lost that is not 
compensated for by the shallow anthropocentric conservationism that may take its place. It may 
seem firstly that a sustained and effective preservation is indeed dependent not only on a 
reasoned understanding of actions deemed necessary, but also of an emotional more direct value 
judgment. The instrumentalist approach seems to be suffering from a version of the hedonic 
treadmill, that the attempt to maximize certain goals in a strictly instrumental manner tends to 
be self-defeating and less efficient than if these goals were considered goals in themselves. In 
the face of the need for tremendous levels of self-regulation, achieving the same sorts of results 
from the instrumental as from the intrinsic value approach might strike us as extremely difficult 
on a psychological level. A similar argument is that of risking compromise in our environmental 
goals, and the lowering of our demands towards that deemed achievable, instead of raising the 
bar of the achievable towards our goals. 
 
In light of this criticism against the core elements of environmental philosophy, the debate over 
whether such concerns should be referred to a separate category of environmental philosophy 
has arisen. Disputes over the ‘real’ aim of environmental philosophy may seem strange, as this 
is simply an open question of what philosophers actually do. Obviousely, there is no legislative 
panel or regulative authority in taxonomical matters of philosophy. When philosophers disagree 
upon the content and meaning of a particular concept, the usual inclination of philosophers is 
to make distinctions.10 As for the dispute over the real purpose of environmental philosophy, 
according to this principle, it should be immediately clear to all that the two sides simply 
advocate to two separate projects in philosophy in a simple dispute over a single name. The 
first sees itself mostly as an ontological inquiry over the metaphysical and moral constitution 
of non-human nature, whereas the other for the most part takes for its project the attempt to 
apply philosophical thought in the response to environmental problems and a tangible 
contribution to the solution of such problems. Many authors find the idea of political or popular 
opinion criteria of success quite awkward when such concerns are simply not their priority. As 
pointed out by Andrew Light, philosophers in the debate like Eric Katz, are reluctant towards 
                                                 
10 One of the few methods in which most philosophers agree with William James’  
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this consequential measure of philosophical validity as a matter of its general and non-academic 
impact and adoptability: 
 At the end, however, Katz may not mind such a limitation of environmental philosophy so much. He 
begins and ends his paper with an attempt to distance himself, and environmental ethics at large, from 
necessarily making a contribution to environmental policy. The true test of an environmental ethic, 
according to Katz is not whether it contributes to a management ethic, or set of polices, but simply whether 
it is right. (Light, 2002, p. 105) 
 
Katz, despite his contributions to pragmatism, remains with the traditional evaluation of 
philosophy as judged by argumentative integrity alone, and as justified, as it were, by its 
philosophical intrinsic worth. Whether environmental philosophy carries an ethical duty to 
provide philosophical contributions towards the resolution of environmental issues remains 
perhaps an ethical question itself, to which Katz and other opponents of pragmatism answers in 
the negative. One might argue that even if an appeal to the ‘roots’ of environmental philosophy 
would be a misplaced argument from authority, there is still due note to be given the fact that 
the particular urgency that initially sparked the discipline, and which massively thrusts its 
motivations today, is indeed owed to the concrete practical reality of the crisis it concerns. For 
this reason it is difficult to accept this criterion of consequential detachment as suggested by 
Katz. 
 Unlike the overwhelming majority of branches in ethics, environmental pragmatists do not 
measure their success in internal argumentative validity alone, without including the ability of 
such arguments to take hold in the real world and amount to more than just ‘being correct’. 
They may count their performance rather like a school teacher, who, rather than attributing class 
results to the performance of the pupils, chooses to see their performance as a measure of her 
own ability to teach. When an ethical argument fails to take hold, this may just as easily be the 
fault of the communicator as that of the listener. heard, there may also be  
A normative accusation that one project is morally inferior to another on the grounds of being 
less effective may also sound suspicious in that we would have to demand converts from all 
other supposed inferior ethical projects as well.  
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2.4 Intrinsic value in environmental pragmatism 
 
The question of intrinsic value, of what it is, where it comes from and what things possess it, 
quickly became the Holy Grail of environmental philosophy, and perhaps the one largest source 
of dispute in the field. Following Richard Sylvan’s previously mentioned Last Man thought 
experiment from 1973 philosophers generally agreed that the task of any environmental ethic, 
if it is to be distinctive from regular ethics, must be to provide an account of independent value 
as found in nature analogous to the way conventional ethics grants independent value to persons 
and human beings. Sylvan’s thought experiment harmonized with many, if not most people’s 
moral intuitions to show that we believe non-human nature must have a value in its own right, 
also in the absence of human beings. The full force of the thought experiment comes when 
pointing out that these intuitions cannot be adequately accounted for by way of conventional 
anthropocentric notions of value. It seemed clear to all environmental philosophers that the span 
of ethical theory which allows only a particular kind of conscious experience (notably that of 
humans) to be inherently valuable was too narrow to capture the full range of things that 
intuitively qualified as independent values. Having experienced the counterexample to the 
absolute truth of anthropocentric ethics, anthropocentrism seemed falsified, demanding its 
opposite, namely non-anthropocentrism be asserted as true. 
For this reason, and surely many more, the intrinsic values in nature, as carrying for a non-
anthropocentrism has arguably become the single largest topic of discussion within the field, 
but according to environmental pragmatists it is also among the most problematic and elusive 
epistemological frontiers of philosophy.  
 
Different answers to what intrinsic values are, and who or what is to be counted among its hosts, 
have given rise to a multitude of positions and ‘centrisms’ aligning with a variety of technical 
distinctions and spectrums. These positions include, but are not limited to anthropocentrism, 
fixating value with the human species, zoosentrism, maintaining animals or consciousness as 
the most general criteria of value; speciescentrism, arriving holisticly with species; biocentrism, 
at life in general; or ecocentrism, at ecosystems. These are often also divided by the metric of 
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holism/individualism according to its considered focal point. Speciescentrism, or most notably 
ecocentrism is firmly categorized within the holistic region, placing value not mainly with the 
individual but at the more general level of species or ecosystems seen as a distinct organic entity 
of value above the sum of its parts. Positions such as anthropocentrism, zoocentrism or 
biocentrism tends to be individually oriented, although not necessarily. Common to them all is 
how they all seem to search for ultimate value, and expect it to be found, in a single unified 
place or aspect of nature. They are ethically monistic in the sense of ascribing value to one 
particular fundamental locus above all others, rather than pluralistic which may allow for 
several different theories to be true simultaneously or by different degrees in different contexts. 
Naturally there is also a varying degree of emphasis and priority among the proponents of these 
positions, sometimes blurring the distinctions. Indeed as seems apparent from the classifications 
above it might seem difficult and odd to fit our intuitions of value completely within only one 
category without simultaneously acknowledging the appeal of the other.  
While the different positions in the debate are notoriously diverse in identifying the location 
intrinsic values, they all have intrinsic values in common as their starting point. However, the 
lexical and metaphysical meaning of this term is also a case of dispute. Initially, intrinsic values 
are straight forwardly understood as the values of which extrinsic, or instrumental, values are 
the end. They are the ends in themselves, in the classical Kantian phrasing, or the ultimate or 
final values that cannot be reduced to, or understood by reference to other values. Katie 
McShane terms it thus: ‘Claims about a thing’s intrinsic value are claims about the distinctive 
way it which we have a reason to care about that thing.’ (2007) Some subtly different 
expressions are also in circulation, like Paul Taylor’s ‘inherent worth’ (2011, p. 71) and Arne 
Næss who employs ‘autotelic value’(2008, p. 225). The two most common, ‘intrinsic’ and 
‘inherent’ are normally used interchangeably, like with  Bill Devall and George Sessions (2008, 
p. 231). However, ‘intrinsic’ value is sometimes distinguished form ‘inherent’ which may be 
used in a wider sense to indicate merely ‘inseparability’ of value from the object without the 
connotation of self-sufficiency. While ‘inherent’ only suggests an adhering of value to an object 
from which it cannot be detached, it is not necessarily as strong as ‘intrinsic’, which marks a 
coming from, and self-sufficiently residing within, the object without external reference. With 
a slight sense of caution we may, according to this, understand all intrinsic values to be also 
inherent values, but not vice versa. Some examples such as tasty food or good health, are 
commonly valued unconditionally and inherently, but not in their own right, meaning that they 
are good only in relation to something else, which disqualifies them from being intrinsic. Tasty 
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food or good health are not ends in themselves, although they are (by most accounts) always 
good, and thus inherently so. There is also a further terminological facet to the literature using 
‘instrumental’ as meaning ‘extrinsic’ and ‘non-instrumental’ as meaning ‘intrinsic’. 
Instrumental’ and ‘non-instrumental’ are oftentimes even equated with ‘anthropocentric’ and 
‘non-anthropocentric’ value respectively. These uses are imprecise, as there can be both 
instrumental and non-instrumental inherent value (where food or health are examples of 
instrumental inherent value). Non-instrumental extrinsic values are also possible, such as a 
good medical test result, which is non-instrumental to any further goal, but still only 
extrinsically good in its relation to something outside itself (Zimmerman, 2010).  
 
These technical nuances are complex and I will not dive further into them here. For the sake of 
clarity and simplicity I will use ‘intrinsic’ in the following to denote the value in question unless 
otherwise necessary. The above may serve, however, as a precursor to the complexities that 
may arise from the philosophical value discussion, which may, according to many 
environmental pragmatists, ultimately warrant their avoidance or even abandonment altogether 
in the name of simplicity and practical operability. While questions over intrinsic value have 
been particularly well-grounded in the environmental philosophy debate, environmental 
pragmatists often presents both theoretical and meta-theoretical reasons for their abandonment.  
The theoretical reasons are most often directed at the theoretical framework of intrinsic value 
upon which conventional environmental ethics is built. This conventional theoretical 
framework is composed by several common facets that according to pragmatists both reduce 
the number of acceptable approaches to the crisis, effectively barring the efforts of experimental 
investigations into non-conventional approaches that may be better adapt at tackling 
environmental problems. However more importantly it also seems to ‘orbit’ around the same 
center of gravity as the opposing anthropocentrized notion of ethics, being defined on its 
premises. Weston writes that:  
‘If the most rigorous and sustained attempts to transcend anthropocentrism still end up in its orbit, 
profoundly shaped by the thought and practices of the anthropocentrized culture within which they arise, 
then we may begin to wonder whether the project of transcending culture in ethical thought is, in fact 
workable at all. Perhaps ethics requires a very different self- conception.’ (Weston, 1996a, p. 143) 
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Richard Watson argues to the same extent that environmental ethics presupposes values in ther 
most manifestly human form when imagining the value og non-human nature: 
‘What would it be, after all, to think like a mountain as Aldo Leopold is said to have recommended? It 
would be anthropocentric because mountains do not think, but also because mountains are imagined to 
be thinking which human interests in their preservation or development they prefer.’(Watson, 2008) 
 
ethics that characterizes Anthony Weston argues that the search for an ‘achemedian point’ in 
ethics, as proposed by John Rawls… Foundationalism, monism and individualism.  
 
 The meta-debate over how what goals environmental philosophers should see for themselves 
and what questions they should investigate of intrinsic value is one of the main areas of interest 
to environmental pragmatists. Especially Bryan Norton, who has been particularly vocal in his 
criticisms of the concept as defining to the environmental movement, argues that the intrinsic 
value question firstly functions only to stalemate the already entrenched positions in the debate, 
and secondly of overshadowing other more fruitful discussions. Minteer explains that  
‘[Norton] has made a series of arguments over the past twenty-five years that the metaphysical and 
epistemological weaknesses of the concept demand that we leave it behind as we grapple with the pressing 
concerns of environmental management and decision making’(2012, p. 57).  
 
Although posing ‘metaphysical and epistemological’ problems is rarely the decisive mark for 
dismissing a project on philosophical grounds (usually containing no problems at all may 
equally well cause us to drop it), Norton’s and other pragmatist’s points are both philosophical 
and meta-philosophical. McShane sums up the criticism neatly: Firstly, she says:  
 
‘as Bruce Morito and Anthony Weston have pointed out, the notion that things can possess value 
independently of the relations they have to other things suggests a peculiarly atomistic picture of the 
world. The more we learn about our world, the more we see it as made up of things that are interrelated, 
interdependent, and defined through their relations with other things.‘ (McShane, 2007, p. 2) 
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the philosophical critique of intrinsic value claims that are metaphysically fundamental, 
commensurably unified and complete. Fundamental in the sense that they refer to in nature and 
fundamentally non-observable or –investigateable in empirical terms. We can note that this is 
somewhat related to the anti-metaphysical arguments of the often claimed descendents of 
classical pragmatism, namely the logical empiricists and the Vienna Circle from the 1920s to 
the 1950s. Secondly, the meta-philosophical, which is Norton’s prime concern (Minteer, 2012, 
p. 59), relates to the commonly perceived mission of environmental philosophy, a mission 
which following Norton seems to be informing and laying the boundaries of the current 
approaches of the debate leading to procedural dogmatism and ultimately stagnation and non-
adaptation. He contrasts his views with the ethical foundationalism and monism of the current 
debate and the popular opinion among theorists that the environmental ethics debate necessarily 
needs to take a non-anthropocentrist monist form in order to qualify as environmental proper 
in Callicott’s or Regan’s understanding11. To Norton it may have seemed at times that 
environmental philosophers take their project to crumble in the case of a failure to articulate a 
coherent, unified, and complete theory of intrinsic value in nature.  
 
However, in the words of my supervisor Arne Johan Vetlesen, intrinsic value is a ‘sticky 
subject’12 in any type of ethical discourse. Indeed, as even environmental pragmatists spend a 
good deal of time discussing why we shouldn’t discuss intrinsic values, it seems there is no 
easy way around it. It seems like values are inextricably tied to action. No matter the name of 
such values, whether instrumental, non-instrumental or along any of the myriad axiological 
scales, it seems necessary that values are the reasons anyone does things. Any action whatsoever 
would seem to necessitate some goal, or some minimal reason that doing the action seems better 
than not doing it. The capacity to possess goals seems to further necessitate some minimal 
degree of desiring and thus valuing. Therefore it seems we cannot extricate valuing from any 
practical philosophy whatsoever. No matter the degree of agreement in practical policy, such 
practical agreement is inextricably tied to some overlapping experience of value, in so far as 
every goal in action necessitates an end which is deemed valuable. In this sense there cannot be 
goals or actions without a minimal underlying value, as all goals are attitudes with a normative 
                                                 
11Callicott and Regan respectively, requoted from Katie McShane: ‘how to discover intrinsic value in nature is 
the defining problem for environmental ethics’; ‘Only by meeting these theoretical criteria can we arrive at an 
ethic […] “of the environment, rather than an ethic for the use of the environment’ (McShane, 2009, p. 408) 
12 Quoted from private conversation. 
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component, which are irreducible to descriptive statements without presupposing a value 
judgment. However, any reading suggesting that environmental pragmatists deny the reality 
and importance of intrinsic values should be avoided, as pragmatists often stress their 
compatibility with nature-centered ethics, without accepting one or the other as true to the 
exclusion of others. Insofar as pragmatism is a sustainability ethics it is often assumed that a 
sustainability ethics naturally conflicts with an environmental ethics proper (in Katz’ and 
Callicott’s sense), whereas this does not need to be the case. Firstly, as is argued in Light and 
Katz, the distinction anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism is ‘meaningless, for it is 
impossible to draw a line between human well-being and the well-being of the environment in 
which it is situated (1996, p. 8). While this may be disputed in several cases, the intention is to 
preface the interrelated notion of value often employed by pragmatists.  
 
‘My purpose is to broaden our conception of the nature and task of ethics, so that we can begin to 
recognize the “ecology”, so to speak, of environmental ethics itself, and thus begin to recognize the true 
conditions under which anthropocentrism might be overcome’ (Weston, 1996a, pp. 139–140) 
 
As non-human nature historically was indeed formalized by ethics as firmly beyond the realm 
of moral considerability, the transition to an expansive nature ethics marked a sudden 
theoretical shift, but was carried by moral sentiments and intuitions that likely followed a far 
more gradual path, which may have had its prelude early beyond. Unfavorable intuitions 
towards the blatant disrespect and lack of humility towards plants and animals, as is permissible 
for instance in Kantianism, are likely not unique in any part of history. As Richard Sylivan’s 
last man example served to form the basis of a non-anthropocentric theory of value, it is 
reasonable to let it also count as the true mark of anthropocentrism, to which the original non-
anthropocentric theory refers. If, in its strictest sense, anthropocentrism represents the negative 
answer to Sylvan’s question of whether there is reason for nature to be preserved in the absence 
of humans, it is hard to tell if there were ever a large amount of people who held this view 
systematically, a view perhaps most easily linked with arrogance, sadism and outright cruelty. 
Today, it is likely even more difficult to find examples of the type of unfettered 
anthropocentrism imagined as the counter-point of non-anthropocentric value. We may realize 
then, that the requirements should be lowered to cover that slightly less-than-cosmological 
attitude that is meant.  
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Minteer is suspicious of whether a fully instrumental (that is anthropocentric) set of 
justifications at the end of the day is capable of capturing and adequately addressing everyday 
value intuitions, which is the very thing environmental pragmatists whishes to adapt to. 
Rethorically he asks:  
[A] question still remains in my mind; Does an instrumentalist reading of environmental values, even one 
as expansive and ostensibly nonmaterialist as Norton’s, accommodate the full range of the public’s 
everyday intuitions and sentiments regarding nonhuman nature? In other words, do instrumental 
arguments for environmental protection exhaust the value discussion, leaving nothing behind once the 
full array of “uses” of ecological components and systems are taken into account across space and time? 
I think not.(Minteer, 2012, p. 58) 
 
As instrumental reasons may carry us a long way in terms of preservation for future generations, 
ecosystems cervices and de-carbonization, he explains, they may also risk doing disservice to 
other branches of the struggle such as animal welfare, which we should be reluctant to sacrifice. 
Further it should be clear that a value platform which only covers select parts of the valuing 
spectrum of everyday people will not be adoptable as a realistic broad starting point for cross-
societal action and policy. However, Minteer asks whether or not Norton’s weak 
anthropocentrism really is to be interpreted in this way as a negative answer to the question of 
intrinsic value in nature, or whether it is primarily an epistemological and meta-philosophical 
stance with regards to the best approach to public influence regardless of the existence of non-
human value in nature. If this is the case, a silent value agnosticism simply deflects any 
accusations of chauvinism against Norton’s weak anthropocentrism. 
 Minteer argues that Norton several times reveals his affiliations with non-human intrinsic 
values. Firstly, Norton mentions the instrumental value of non-instrumental valuing. He 
emphasizes how the mere attitude of non-anthropocentrism certainly is beneficial 
instrumentally to environmental issues, whether this value attitude would prove true or not. 
Acknowledging that such attitudes could render anyone much more prone towards pro-
environmental behaviour than abstract and impersonal instrumental reasons alone, it would be 
silly to discourage intrinsic value in nature-attitudes: ‘[I]t would not be surprising that speaking 
as if nature has intrinsic value could provide useful guidance in adjusting human felt 
preferences.’(original emphasis; Norton, 2003, p. 172) But secondly, and more importantly, 
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Norton never seems to directly challenge the idea that non-human nature may possess value 
independent of human instrumental purposes. In fact, Ben Minteer notes how he even 
sometimes includes the protection of nature for its own sake in his arguments for claims that 
his style has become and in fact even in his abstract of his 1985 paper Beyond intrinsic value 
(Light & Katz, 1996, p. 2)he remarks how ‘It becomes easy to justify respect for other life forms 
and concern for the natural environment, and indeed many of the standard arguments only 
become stronger, once the demand to establish intrinsic values is removed’(Weston, 1996b). 
He still maintains that instrumental human values should be sufficient for an adequate 
environmental ethic, and that it should not require ‘questionable ontological commitments’ 
(Norton, 2003, p. 172) to highly precise value claims such as advocated by Callicott or Katz  
when advocating that such discoveries of precise value is the very essence of any true 
environmental ethics. drawing in the very last sentence in his article on Occham’s Razor, but 
nevertheless seems to be   
 
Remarks on how Norton’s later ‘multi-centrism’ inspired by his holism, reveals his intentions 
more clearly; that the foundational notion of final value is a reductionism which cuts short the 
full range of value in his interconnected holist view. His point is not to deny value outside of 
humans, rather the opposite; to argue for the complexity and plurality of values in all 
manifestations which arises out of all parts of a circular value chain, and through its diversity 
escapes capture in definite foundational theories of value in the simple binary metric of 
instrumental/non-instrumental.  
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2.5 Pluralism and Norton’s convergence hypothesis 
 
2.5.1 Pluralism 
 
Kelly Parker defines moral pluralism as ‘the view that no single moral principle, or over-arching 
theory of what is right, can be appropriately applied to all ethically problematic situations.’ 
(1996, pp. 31–32) Andrew Light has further distinguished between both a theoretical and meta-
theoretical pluralism: ‘Theoretical pluralism is the acknowledgement of distinct, theoretically 
incommensurable basis for direct moral consideration. […] Metatheoretical pluralism involves 
an openness to the plausibility of divergent ethical theories working together in a single moral 
enterprise […]’ (Light & Katz, 1996, p. 4) Light considers himself primarily a metatheoretical 
pragmatist, or a ‘procedural pragmatist’, as his primary concern is not with expounding on 
theories of intrinsic value, but to go beyond them, in order to bring attention to practical matters. 
This contrasts to Anthony Weston’s elaborate attempts at an interrelational concept of intrinsic 
value. These two approaches might appear to contradict, but I think is fair to grant them 
compatibility both because they are equally oriented towards the goal of enabling more efficient 
ways to enable action and environmental agency – making environmentalism more palatable to 
everyday diverse people, so to say, but also because the second order approach to ethics, in 
Light’s case, posits no specific requirements for position in the question of the first order level 
and vice versa. They are both sufficiently separated through their different layers so as to not 
overlap into contradiction. The whole idea of a meta-ethical pluralism is exactly to open up to 
different ideas of intrinsic value that may be helpful to common goals. It also seems harsh to 
deny meta-ethical pluralists like Light the freedom of an opinion at the first level question of 
value. 
By accepting pluralism in both forms as opposed to monism, both Light and Weston abandons 
the mission to discover the correct and most justifiable ethical positions towards nature. 
However this is not seen as a concession or an ethical pull-back, but rather a step outside the 
confines of what it considers a stagnated project in ethical monism. By rejecting to propose yet 
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another, more justifiable or philosophically tenable ethical position in the attempt to make real 
progress, it rather attempts what can be likended to a Rawlsian approach to progress, an 
approach which does not set as its goal to anihilate plurality of opinion, but which rather works 
with plurality as the necessary backdrop of social change.  
Both theoretical and meta-theoretical pluralism are important features of the pragmatic 
contributions to environmental philosophy, however weighted differently in the literature. To 
the degree that environmental pragmatism positions itself as a meta-theoretical comment on 
paradigmatic features of the discipline, its pluralism serves a primarily practical function to 
overcome the difficulties of monism. And a statement that if an environmental strategy is to 
work, it cannot reasonably depend upon the converting of humanity to any particular brand of 
philosophical non-anthropocentrism. in Pluralism becomes a way of admitting of Rawlsian 
social plurality of ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ in a society whose citizens are ‘deeply 
divided by conflicting and even incommensurable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines’ 
(Rawls, 2005, p. 133). In the same fashion meta-theoretical pluralism aims to dismiss the idea 
that social or political unity must be based upon fundamental consensus. As equally rational 
individuals may arrive rationally at fundamentally opposing ‘comprehensive doctrines’ or 
world views – society will function not despite allowing this incongruence, but because of 
allowing it.  
 
2.5.2 The convergence hypothesis  
As pragmatists typically seek to avoid the highly technical form of the discussions, they wish 
to replace them with a serious investigation on the merits of moral pluralism. In what has been 
termed ‘the convergence hypothesis’ of environmental philosophy, Bryan Norton has argued to 
the support of pragmatic pluralism in ethics, that different environmental positions, both 
anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric, tend to arrive at roughly the same principles for 
action and practical policy (Norton, 1997). According to Norton, the theoretical battleground 
of envionrmental philosopy seems to carry very little significance counted difference to practice 
or to common political goal. Justifications in favour of theoretical debate is often anchored in 
the prospect of competing moral claims. However, by providing arguments that environmental 
acton is very rarely altered by such differences, this justification is undermined. Remembering 
the Peirceian remarks about relevance to experience (chap. 2.2.1), a pragmatist outlook would 
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suggest that as long at the theoretical differences of theories render no particular difference to 
our experience or to our action, the difference is metaphysical and unintelligible to us. 
Predictably, the correctness of the hypothesis is loudly denied by proponents of intrinsic value 
theory, such as J. Baird Callicott, who argue that such compromise leaves out fundamental parts 
of an adequate ethic that is not compensated for by the fact that different ethics happen to arrive 
at similar results.  
 
Unsurprisingly, Callicott and others have contested the claims made by Norton in his 
convergence hypothesis, and the pluralistic invitations to the opponent of environmental ethics 
(Callicott, 2009). According to Callicott, dilemmas of competing claims of diverging ethics 
make for no good common ground staring point of a pluralistic ethic either. However, an 
empirical study conducted by Ben Minteer and Robert Manning ‘supports the  a generalized 
version of Norton's thesis’ (2000) strengthening the grounds for Norton’s moral pluralism. 
Callicott’s and others’ objections are likely linked to a resistance to the consequentialist notion 
that the right choice for the wrong reasons is ethically equal to the right choices for the right 
reasons. Even from a consequential viewpoint, the right actions for the wrong reasons seems to 
amount to an unstable temporary situation when correct actions are contingent upon cheer 
coincidence. Differences of moral principle while not of moral conduct may inevitably seem to 
be bound to confrontation in one form or another, even if temporarily aligned. However, when 
arguing that the convergence hypothesis is correct not in spite of differences but mainly because 
people tend to have similar values, this picture of wrong reasons seem dissipated. 
At any rate, the sharp distinction between right or wrong reasons or principles also seems 
suspicious from the pragmatist viewpoint. If this consequential reason for admitting the role of 
principle seems unsatisfying – the respect for principles not because they are right but because 
of their instrumental necessity – we can remind ourselves that that the distinction between true 
and  -à-vis the argument for values –a respect for the consequences of right reasons is a respect 
for right reasons. To draw the deontological analogy, the respect for the moral law of 
truthfulness, i.e., seems to be inherently intertwined with our respect for the subsistence of the 
institution of truthfulness. Questioning the order of priority between this functioning of the truth 
institution on the one hand, and the moral law on the other, asking which is more fundamental, 
as though one is universal and the other is not, is to make assumptions of their ontological 
separateness, rather than their being descriptions of the same. Such an interrelated dynamic 
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understanding of ethics is very much in tune with the holistic functional notion of value put 
forth by Antony Weston.  
 
2.6 A new type of ethics 
 
Surely, the reason for opting for a rethinking of ethics is not the result of philosophical 
incoherency on behalf of previous conceptions of ethics, but is rather the response to a perceived 
lack in the range of ethics. As Anthony Weston puts it:  
‘Pragmatism insists most centrally on the interrelatedness of our values. The notion of fixed ends is 
replaced by a  picture of values dynamically interdepending with other values and with beliefs, choices 
and exemplars: pragmatism offers, metaphorically at least, a kind of “ecology” of values.’ (1996b, p. 285) 
To the extent that sharp distinctions function to divide and limit, rather than to aid the 
understanding and enable action, they are seen as wrong not from a lack of argumentative 
power, but in terms of inhibiting the very goal the theory was constructed to aid. Thus the 
feature most distinctive to pragmatist environmental ethics is likely its tendency to blur the 
usual sharp lines in ethics and the paradigmatic dichotomies; the distinctions between 
individual objects of value, the distinction of anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, or 
even the is-ought-divide from David Hume, in accordance with the normative features of truth 
described by William James. To the pragmatist, then, environmental progress appears possible 
from a simply descriptive perspective, as the values to be protected seem already implicit and 
readily identifiable from the merely descriptive level. As already valuing nature in various ways 
by virtue of being environmentalists there seems no need not formulate any theory of intrinsic 
value so long as intrinsic value is already embedded in our action. If already treating nature as 
though having intrinsic value in practice as it must be implicit in every action and desire, and 
there is no need to imprint an abstract notion of value from the outside. 
 As mentioned previously, ordinary ethics seem bent only to answer the individual normative 
questions of ‘what ought we do’ while at the same time leaving the question of ‘how to do what 
we ought to do’ untouched. If we are to succeed in bringing a large portion of humanity over to 
the class of agents acting morally, it seems we must understand what preconditions are required 
for such a massive tilt on the distribution curve of moral agency. It appears we cannot just 
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require the populations of the world to shape up in a fit of moral indignation, much the same 
way that moral appeal is unlikely to affect crime-rates or the like. Weston brings the practical 
character of practise and moral action into play in his ‘enabling environmental practice’ 
(Weston, 1996a, p. 152). In reflecting on the interactive relationship between practises and 
principles that occurs in social ethical evolution, he points out that ethics are misunderstood if 
contrived to function as a unilateral top-down mechanism in which the agent is conceived as a 
passive receiver of principles. , when the its theoretical prescriptions are as much submitted to 
and informed by real practical practises that precede them. The attempt to induce ethical 
principles abstractly outside the frame of practise to start with could be a bit as unnatural and 
forced as the learning of a foreign language through the abstract deconstructive rules of 
grammar, which is in reverse order compared to the childhood learning of language through 
spontaneous practice which only discloses its theoretical structure upon later reflection after-
the-fact. 
 
There is a problem, according to Weston inn the concentric picture of ethics, in which moral 
standing is awarded in accordance with an expanding circle, continuously referring to its center 
(Weston, 2004). As the continued expansion of ethics are appearing to circle around an 
epicentre in humanity, it may seem like we are still dealing with a type of anthropocentrism 
with small shooting branches out into nature through which we ascribe it value in extension of 
out human value. Weston’s so called ‘multi-centrism’ takes for granted that for value to be truly 
independent (which as is recalled is required of intrinsic value) it must not be seen as a 
continuation of human ethics or understood as deriving its value by virtue of some resemblance 
to the value of human beings. Rather it must be incommensurable and irreducible to other 
values.13 Perhaps the continued expansion of ethics in this way, as has been the norm in the first 
and still only valid attempt to accommodate the need for moral standards across a non-human 
domain. These expansionist attempts still risk anthropocentrsm in terms of attempting to 
integrate non-human elements in a distinctly human-oriented ethics. As its value is understood 
in this way, as deriving from the human value conception . Value is understood on the premises 
of the valuer rather than on the premises of the valued as an epistemological limitation inherent 
to perspective. Of course, anything else is impossible, as we cannot step out of ourselves to 
                                                 
13 This idea could lead to the conclusion that all value, including human values must also be incommensurable, 
so that we cannot value anything against a common denominator of value. Then there can be no ‘equal’ or 
‘unequal’ value except from just value in it self 
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experience first-hand the value we attempt to asses. Thomas Nagel famously points out that we 
cannot know what it is like to be a bat (1974). Far less can we be a mountain or an ecosystem, 
which makes them even harder to approximate from the human perspective. Perhaps it is a 
mistake, then, to interpret these entities in analogue to the human values that we have access to 
experiencing from our perspective, rather than postulating an ontologically different, 
incommensurable type of value altogether outside the epistemological reach of what can be 
approximated using human values. As mentioned earlier, Richard Watson argues that 
anthropomorphic projections of human value as in Aldo Leopolds phrase ‘thinking like a 
mountain’ are exactly examples of such analogies, which tend to fall right back into the 
anthropocentric value understanding by interpreting nature values as an extension of human 
values (Watson, 2008). The Humean problem of transcending ones simple impressions in 
synthesizing complex ideas like golden mountains comes to mind: It would indeed appear 
impossible to conceive of any radically different type of value if the value shares no common 
properties with human values with which to connect them and make them comprehendible to 
us. However, this epistemic gap to understanding the exact nature of non-human values should 
not be in the way of accepting what Weston calls multicentrism (2004), a model which attempts 
to cancel the ‘centrism’ aspect of ethics altogether in proposing that value does not need a 
common denominator for common reference, just as values needs no absolute moral grounding 
before being distinguishable in relation to other values. In suggesting that value needs not at all 
be unified he opens the possibility of value pluralism, where many incommensurable types of 
values may be conceived as coexisting, but without being comparable by any externally 
observable criteria. 
 
2.7 Beyond intrinsic value and non-anthropocentric 
monism 
 
Environmental pragmatists find that one of the greatest common denominators of 
environmental philosophies, the evaluative thesis, need not be as indispensable and defining to 
a workable environmental ethic as widely assumed. An often cited quotation from Anthony 
Weston’s 1985 article ‘Beyond Intrinsic Value’ he states: ‘The real power of the pragmatic 
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approach lies in what it does not say, in what it has removed the need to say’ (1996b). Although 
environmental pragmatists seldom deny the truth of the evaluative thesis14, they argue that its 
considered importance as a precisely defined theoretical foundation may in fact be either idle 
or counterproductive to the ultimate goals of environmental philosophy, in so far as such 
ultimate goals are indeed practical and not merely theoretical for its own sake. In environmental 
ethics at large, we likely find that the evaluative thesis in its myriad forms is motivated both by 
instrumental and inherent reasons. That is, its reasons for being adopted philosophically seem 
to be twofold, divided in both its philosophical integrity and persuasiveness in its own right, 
but also for its instrumental use in facilitating the readjustment of values and conducts towards 
nature. We might find that regardless of our position on the centrism-scale, we should as 
environmental philosophers always support the promotion of a non-anthropocentric over an 
anthropocentric or instrumental position if we want to advance environmental behaviour 
effectively. Ben Minteer touches upon this when he asks:  
‘Should we not, as environmental philosophers, recognize the potential usefulness of such 
noninstrumental claims for motivating individuals and in warranting environmental practices and policies 
– at least in some situations?’ (Minteer, 2012, p. 58) 
 
These would, from the anthropocentric point of view appear as deviant causes (or justifications) 
to environmental practises, which to them serve to motivate the right kinds of actions but only 
through the wrong kinds of reasons. This is an argument often used for example to defend the 
strong position of religious practises which retain their social or moral functions regardless of 
the ontological truth of religious justifications provided. This instrumental side of the evaluative 
thesis, however, pragmatists dismiss on the alleged experience that the evaluative thesis 
scarcely works better in motivating behaviour than its ethical competitors, and that it is thus of 
generally low instrumental use to the environmental campaigns which take it as its most 
fundamental axiom. As in any dilemma of choosing whether to pursue or abandon a theory 
                                                 
14 Minteer for instance asks: ‘[D]o instrumental arguments for environmental protection exhaust the value 
discussion, leaving nothing behind once the full array of “uses” of ecological components and systems are taken 
into account across space and time? I think not.’ (2012, p. 58) He further argues that ‘[Bryan] Norton is not 
necessarily assailing the merit of noninstrumentalist views toward nature, but is instead implying that those 
holding these views have, at the very least, some meta-ethical explaining to do and that this type of value should 
not be assumed to be the only ground for an acceptable environmental ethic’. (Minteer, 2012, p. 60) It should 
seem clear that declining to operate with any particular closely defined notion of value does not exempt one 
from the view that independent values may exist in whatever form. Even if Norton declines the use of ‘intrinsic 
value’ even in describing patently human values, nobody seems to accuse Norton of nihilism, as such a supposed 
denial of any type of value would imply. 
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based on lack of positive support, is clear that such a conclusion doesn’t follow. As every good 
theorist knows, the absence of evidence does not entail evidence of absence. However, for 
different reasons, the moral potency of such argument in causing or inspiring radical behaviour 
change across wide populations seems rather weak both intuitively and empirically, they argue. 
If so the instrumental rationale for upholding the evaluative thesis should be ruled out. The 
movement's prime contention is that regardless of whatever position on the moral status of 
nature should be the most philosophically tenable, what should matter most to us given the 
urgency of the current problems, is finding the most effective solutions, instead of waiting to 
arrive at infinitesimally more accurate ones. If adopting this approach, the natural consequence, 
according to environmental pragmatists, would be to endorse some brand of moral pluralism in 
the attempt to unite common efforts to an optimized environmental output. 
 
In the seminal 1985 paper by Anthony Weston entitled ‘Beyond intrinsic value - Pragmatism 
in environmental ethics’ Weston carefully introduces the idea of an environmental pragmatism 
by the disclaimer that:  
“Pragmatism sounds like just what environmental ethics is against: shortsighted, human-centered 
instrumentalism. In popular usage that connotation is certainly common. Philosophical pragmatism, 
however, offers a theory of values which is by no means committed to that crude anthropocentrism, or 
indeed to any anthropocentrism at all.” (Weston, 1996b, p. 285) 
 
This apologetic precursor is also found elsewhere, such as this prophylactic injection by Kelly 
Parker, who states:  
“’Pragmatism’ here refers to a school of philosophical thought – American pragmatism – and not to that 
short sighted, allegedly ‘practically-minded’ attitude towards the world that is a major obstacle to 
environmentally responsible behavior in our time” (Parker, 1996, p. 21) 
 
The anxiety is no doubt justified, as pragmatism has often been rather sceptically received 
throughout the community. Seen as a challenger to the very front of environmentalism and its 
core non-anthropocentric project, environmental pragmatists are often seen defending 
themselves against charges of relativism, anti-philosophy, and the dissipation of philosophical 
duty, which will also be discussed in this chapter. Weston remarks, however that “[o]ne charge 
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of anthropocentrism should not detain us” (Weston, 1996b, p. 285). It is worth avoiding the 
misconception that environmental pragmatism as such promotes anthropocentrism in its regular 
sense15, as although pragmatists are unwilling to endorse particular theories of inherent value 
in nature, they are also typically unwilling to reject them, opting rather for a pluralistic value 
agnosticism instead of an absolute monistic position. As previously discussed, even Brian 
Norton who argues the case for his ‘weak anthropocentrism’ (while he prefers the less loaded 
term ‘humanism’) seems to distance himself from the classical strong anthropocentric view that 
human beings alone can be centres of ultimate value. Pragmatism in environmental philosophy 
represents rather what Ben Minteer calls ‘environmentalism’s third way, playing on the 
classical pragmatist attempt of bringing together the two parts in the great chasm in philosophy.  
In Minteer’s third way he attempts to moderate between the two major ‘schools’ of 
environmental thought, namely anthropocentric reformism of the so called ‘shallow ecologists’ 
on the one hand, and the ecocentric intrinsic value theorists, such as the deep ecologists or 
biocentrists on the other. (Minteer, 2006). As there are many possible sources to improved 
behaviour towards the environment, according to environmental pragmatists, none should be 
denounced solely on account of omitting allegiance to any particular abstract notion of intrinsic 
value in nature. Such cooperative restrictions, they argue, seem an unaffordable luxury in 
today’s situation, and seem to serve no real purpose in environmentalism. Thus environmental 
pragmatists typically suggest lowering the requirements of an adequate ethics contend brand of 
ethical pluralism in the attempt to unite diverse efforts towards commonly recognized goals. 
Brian Norton famously argues, as mentioned above, that anthropocentrist contributions to the 
environmental campaign need not be dismissed, as long as they give us adequate reasons to 
avoid careless storage of ‘toxic wastes, overpopulation, wanton extinctions, air and water 
pollution, etc.’(Norton, 2003, p. 163). Admittedly such an ‘adequate’ ethic falls short of what 
ethics usually aim for in a ‘true’ ethic, but meets the same adequacy criterion of any ethic with 
which he is willing to cooperate. It seems to pragmatists that the route to such goals as 
sustainability, animal welfare, species and eco-system preservation and the like now takes a 
                                                 
15 Although Norton admittedly defends what he calls ’weak anthropocentrism’ this should be sharply contrasted 
with the regular sense of the word which holds that moral standing is strictly reserved human ends. Norton’s 
sense of anthropocentrism is based on ‘considered preference’ as opposed to ‘felt preference’ (Norton, 2003, p. 
164). This marks the difference to moral systems where the fulfillment of direct human interests (felt interests) 
may count, and opens for a conception of value that regards as good whatever is ‘considered’ to be valuable 
without any other further commitments to the interests of the valuer. This distinction is left vague, perhaps 
intentionally so, but it steps dangerously close to a conception of intrinsic value in its defense of treating nature 
as if having intrinsic value. Norton’s later example of the sand dollar also seems to reveal an attitude that sand 
dollars are inherently valuable, but only refusing to use those words (Norton, 1994, pp. 3–4). 
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long and unnecessary detour if forced through the confounding philosophical controversies of 
intrinsic value, and ultimately, of that overly restrictive criterion of philosophical truth. If the 
intricate debate surrounding the evaluative thesis functions to impede general agreement and 
the progress on basic policy principles, then these efforts should be suspended in favour of more 
constructive projects.  
 
Rather, even as environmental pragmatists most often reject the label of non-anthropocentrism 
(as they decline most labels of monistic value theories altogether), they most often also reject 
one of anthropocentrism in the traditional meaning, with the notable exception of the weak 
anthropocentric position endorsed by Weston. Their rejection of non-anthropocentrism as a 
basis for ethics must not be confused with the objectionable stance that only humans may have 
moral standing. They reject these labels for the same reason that they reject the whole metric 
along the so called expansionist scale of ethics that has gained dominance in environmental 
thinking. The expansionist scale, in short, is the mode of ethical thinking characterised by the 
continuous expansion of the ethical circle – that is the domain of things granted ethical concern, 
and particularly intrinsic value. Christopher D. Stone describes the expansionist scale along 
which environmental philosophy has operated with the words of Darwin, explaining:  
‘Originally, each man had regardonly for himself and those of a very narrow circle around him; later, he 
came to regard more and more “not only the welfare, but the happiness of all his fellow-men”; then “his 
sympathies became more and more tender and widely diffused, extending to all races, to the imbecile, 
maimed, and other useless members of society, and finally to the lower animals….”’ (Stone, 2008, p. 
298) 
 It is along this axis that the dualist division between anthropocentrist and non-anthropocentrist 
ethics first arose. The first relates to a human-centred, conservatively narrow circle of values 
ascribing intrinsic independent value strictly to human beings alone. The second relates to an 
expanded, wider circle of values (how wide is one of the most frequent topics of discussion) 
eclipsing those values relating strictly to human concerns. Depending on what is meant by 
‘expansion’ we can contrive from this at least two possible understandings of anthropocentrism 
and non-anthropocentrism; One which considers a view non-anthropocentric in so far as it 
admits at least moral standing, that is to say any sort of inherent value to some aspect of the 
natural world; and one which requires equal value be ascribed in the egalitarian senses before 
it qualifies.  
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In both cases, the particular technical formulation of two dimensional expansionist ethics is 
perhaps the greatest objection of pragmatists. One aspect of this objection is with the concept 
of intrinsic value, which several philosophers, Norton included, dismisses it as an unnecessary 
concept to environmental progress. Perhaps certain conducts and actions may elicit or prescribe 
a theory of intrinsic value. However, such theory is not retroactive, and theory does not in the 
same way elicit action directly, and provides neither direct motivations nor long term 
internalisation simply through its own wording alone. It seems spontaneously clear that a theory 
of moral conduct follows after the moral conduct which it describes and is predicated upon. It 
is not through any abstract and sterile observance of theory that values are in fact valued, but it 
is the practical valuing that leads to the attempts to capture value by theory. Therefore theories 
of intrinsic value is secondary to the valuing. 
 
He proposes instead an ethical ‘multi-centrism’ in which a plurality of incommensurable value 
centra may replace the old expansionist (and by that same tolken commensurable) notion of 
value. who emphasizes practicality over theory, and wishes to expand the understanding of 
ethics into an ‘ecology’ of ethics itself, in the attempt to understand how ethical theory can be 
converted to change of action; ‘enabling environmental action’, and discover the ‘true 
conditions under which anthropocentrism might be overcome’ (Weston, 1996b, pp. 139–140). 
laments the over-abstraction in the field of ethics which runs the risk of missing the real and 
concrete ways in which humans interact with the non-human world. That is not to say that 
pragmatists desire simplification or dread capturing the indubitably complex and abstract nature 
of these interactions. Rather they often call for a turn away from the familiar two dimensional 
ethics. The real point of difference between environmental pragmatists and non-
anthropocetrists, in other words, is not so much the content of such values as seen in 
environmental philosophy, but rather the form of these values. Indeed, a major point made by 
environmental pragmatists is the way that the practical content of these values converge despite 
their theoretical differences. Some environmental pragmatists even contest the notion of 
intrinsic value itself, but ethical concern and value, whatever form it might take, is manifestly 
ascribed to non-human loci by both by pragmatists and non-anthopocentrists alike. The 
formulation of those values, and the strategies to protect them differ. The misconception of 
anthropocentrism in pragmatism is seemingly widespread. This separation of form and content 
 49 
 
follows the spirit of William James asserting that pragmatism “does not stand for any special 
results. It is a method only.”  
Norton argues that a non-anthropocentric preference to treat nature as possessing intrinsic value 
may still count as weakly anthropocentric by still depending formally on the satisfaction of a 
human preference towards nature and being still directed towards the realization of a traceably 
human value (Norton, 1984). He argues that the satisfaction of some non-anthropocentric value 
theory still counts as a human interest, and therefore that it is in reality founded on what he calls 
human considered interests. Non-anthropocentrism is thus still a strictly human affair, and 
much to its demise, is defined precisely through the human oriented value concepts it seeks to 
avoid. In parallel with the classical problem of altruism, it is not clear that the protection of 
interests external to the agent can ever be fully explained in terms of interests completely 
disjoined and external to the valuer. In other words, the protection of value always implies a 
fulfilment of some type of interest on behalf of the valuer. Norton’s case can be illustrated by 
imagining a mother caring for her child. The mother acts selflessly in her caring, sacrificing her 
own well being for that of the child, and understands her own actions and behaviour not in 
terms of her own desires in relation to the child, but in terms of the child’s self-contained moral 
status and of its external and independent (intrinsic) good. However, Norton might insist that 
the behaviour of the mother still counts as a fulfilling of a considered interest of the mother, 
given by the fact of her valuing her child. This is not to say that the child is not inherently 
valuable, or somehow of a mere instrumental value to the mother’s satisfaction of considered 
interest. It merely implies that the recognition of value by a valuer requires an interest. If a 
valuer cannot be said to entertain a minimal interest towards some object, the object cannot be 
said to be valued by the valuer. This does not exclude the possibility of value, either inherent 
or extrinsic, subsiding with the object per se. It does, however, maintain the role of the valuer 
to a value system, and claims that valuers cannot fully extract themselves from the any 
recognition of intrinsic values  
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2.8 Criticism and problems 
 
It should be clear that even if aiming at bypassing the usual emphasis on philosophical rigidity 
and clear definitions, environmental pragmatists do take seriously the philosophical or logical 
problems of their theories. This should be clear insofar as environmental pragmatism is still a 
part in the philosophical discourse. Not doing so would firstly risk depriving it of any serious 
attention within philosophical communities whatsoever, and secondly would manifest exactly 
the type of absolutist attitude it wishes to avoid, which is not open to revision or improvement. 
Many criticisms have been, and no doubt will continue to be raised as the discussion continues, 
and no philosophical position of any value have done away with its problems entirely. It is 
tempting to conclude that critical discussion is not as much a threat as a healthy sign of a 
promising future. As environmental pragmatism has already packed a certain amount of 
discussion behind its back despite its relative novelty in the debate, critics have already brought 
to bear on a number of issues and potential problems that should deserve attention from anyone 
serious about developing environmental pragmatism towards an adapted, tenable position. 
Some of these charges include relativism, materialism, reductionism, anti-philosophy, duty-
dissipation, and obviously of both hard and soft anthropocentrism.  
First I want to give special mention to some of the criticisms that I will not be discussing 
thoroughly before I move on: First, the debate over whether or not environmental pragmatism 
qualifies as a philosophy, as it is claimed that ‘metaphilosophical environmental pragmatism 
provides no philosophical content’(Callanan, 2010, p. 133), or that it evades exactly the types 
of questions that environmental philosophy is supposed to answer (Pearson, 2014; Samuelsson, 
2010). These are among the most frequent accusations proponents of environmental 
pragmatism engage. A first note to this is that classifying pragmatism as negative content 
(which I believe is a mistake) should in any case be far from declaring it as ‘no content’, the 
way it is often intended to mean lesser in force and implication than its positive counterparts. 
This application of the distinction between positive and negative seems dubious at best if we 
are right to note that negative conclusions are as much positive philosophical arguments as 
arguments with positive conclusions. There are obviously many ways in which what a 
philosophy is not counts as equally important as what it is. Concerning the positive suggestions 
of environmental pragmatism, like its suggestions for value-theory, these have already been 
addressed earlier, and will not be dealt with further here. Likewise, I have addressed the issue 
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of what ‘questions environmental philosophy is supposed to answer’ by denying that the 
classical question of ‘what we ought to do’ is the only question for ethics, or that ‘how to find 
intrinsic nature in value’ conceived as such must be the only enterprise of a distinctly 
environmental philosophy.  
Second, the criticism that pragmatism amounts to anthropocentrism has been rejected both by 
showing to problems with the terminological framework, as well as pointing to the fact that the 
pragmatic project is not to discredit the notion of human independent value, but rather to move 
beyond it in the discourse or reject the requirement of non-anthropocentrism for any legitimate 
and productive position in environmental ethics.  
Third, the last mention goes to the charge of relativism, particularly in the context of pluralism, 
which claims the pragmatic rejection of moral grounding means it is doomed to float free, 
potentially serving anti-environmental values if prompted by the right context. This is often 
answered by insisting that reasonability rather than ‘truth’ serves as grounding, and that the 
endorsements of pragmatism are not free-floating at all, as there are limits to what can be 
considered ‘reasonable’ positions (cf. Jardins, 2012, p. 263). As there is abundant literature on 
these most common objections already, I will conclude these remarks and move on with some 
other possible problems which have received less attention, and then present some of my own 
responses. 
.  
2.8.1 Is pragmatism self-enclosed as well? 
 
Environmental pragmatists have from the outset criticized the reigning purportedly self-
enclosed paradigm in environmental ethics and suggested a new set of criteria for philosophical 
success. These criteria should be based not on internal philosophical integrity and 'whether the 
philosophy is right' like the view of Eric Katz' and many others (Light, 2002, p. 105), but on 
whether it works in gaining public acceptance and in bringing momentum to real environmental 
action. Now, some 30 years in the making16 it seems only natural to turn its own criticisms 
against itself to see how it holds up. To the degree that it rejects traditional environmental 
                                                 
16 Counting from the initial text by Weston 
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philosophy on the grounds of lacking the capability for non-academic impact and for stretching 
beyond academics, the question raised by its own terms then becomes whether it is itself capable 
of escaping the predicament of internal confinement. Being about exactly the same age as 
environmental philosophy as a focused discipline was at the time, loosely speaking, it might be 
pertinent to see whether pragmatists have spent their time better. We then start by asking the 
obvious question of whether or not pragmatism has gained any sort of impact similar to the one 
it was criticising conventional environmental ethics to lack. It might seem off-hand that it has 
not, and that the discussions of environmental pragmatism also remain quite within the same 
abstract theoretical frame as that to which it is a purported alternative.  
In this respect, the environmental pragmatist movement has indeed also experienced a bit of 
inertia, much in the same way as other environmental movements, not only in terms of outward 
influence, but also internally among professional philosophers. To the extent that examples of 
their practical application can be shown for, it should at least be uncontroversial that its 
theoretical focus still outweighs any practical efforts that are made in extension of their practical 
intentions. So there seems to be several departures from what its early theorists might have 
hoped for. It looks like the vision of environmental pragmatism involved three goals; (1) 
distinguishing itself theoretically from mainstream environmental philosophy and the 
theoretical frameworks and discussions of non-anthropoentric monism and (2) to establish an 
appeals not only inwards in academia but also outwards towards the general public that it sought 
to influence. The hope in turn being that this would provide (3) wide acceptance and influence 
in broad regions of the public and internally in academia. The two first would be in its own 
power to control, and the last being the hope of good reception following from the successful 
completion of the two first. However as it stands it could seem environmental pragmatism so 
far achieved none of the above, as it is still engaged in the same theoretical discussions circling 
questions of value and non-anthropocentrism, it is still not outwardly applied, and it has not 
been adopted, neither inside academia nor outside.  
It is certainly hard to deny that environmental pragmatism at present is devoting a lot of effort 
to stabilize itself as a coherent set of positions within the academic community, or that it is in 
fact addressing mainly academic theoretical issues aimed at an academic audience, in the exact 
same way as its environmental predecessors. If environmental pragmatism as an academic 
discipline or movement is emerging equally confined to the same abstract and internal level of 
debate with which it first took issue at its early stage, there could be grounds for concern. 
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Furthermore, even if it had accomplished everything it portrayed to become at the outset, the 
most serious concern might be if point (3) turned out to fail and that the very ideas of 
environmental pragmatism fully realised proved to be unpopular or without the potential for 
propagation in either the public or in environmental philosophy.  
Indeed one could argue that the very attempt to become applied and practical rather than 
theoretical plays out in an inherently non-applied fashion. This might be somewhat of a paradox 
if advocating ‘action over words’ is itself a word-based approach and an inherent manifestation 
of its opposite. There is no contradiction, however in admitting that pragmatists can engage at 
the non-technical applied level as well as on the technical level at the terms of those theorists it 
seeks to persuade. However, even when forgiving this need to attack theoretical problems 
despite its aspirations to simplicity and non-technicality, there is still the question of why it has 
not yet simultaneously branched out to the outside world as it first suggested, in order to achieve 
the pervasive influence it aims for. 
If, however, the charge is worded as an attack against pragmatists themselves and the way they 
have conducted their project, one might note that this charge contains a strain of the ad hominem 
tu quoque fallacy: Claiming hypocrisy with the proponents of environmental pragmatism does 
little to refute the original argument itself. If there proves to be a failure on the part of 
environmental pragmatists to employ the ideas they set out with, this is not a valid to reject the 
ideas themselves. However, we can refine the criticism to include how pragmatists have argued 
that the adoptability and practical potency of a theory must be measured empirically by the 
success of those who employ it. In this case the criticism may still be sound if either the course 
staked out in the beginning (tasks (1) and (2)) have proven not in fact feasible, or if the course 
was followed through, but without seeing the expected outcome of (3). If it is the case that the 
progress so far achieved with pragmatism constitutes a negative datum17 as to its success and 
impact, that it has performatively disaffirmed itself like the purported case of environmental 
philosophy at large, it seems environmental pragmatism suffers from the same issues as those 
                                                 
17 Although absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, and negative data are not logically sufficient for 
positive disaffirmation, as known by the induction-problem, the disaffirmation could be construed in a positive 
sense. One still knows nothing of whether the theory will work in the future, but one has at least proven it to not 
always work, which is a weaker affirmation, but a positive one. With pragmatists, however, the induction 
problem, just as in the sciences, does not really weigh heavily with regards to abandoning a theory that does not 
seem to work. 
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of the opposing parties in environmental philosophy that it sought to heal. However, there is a 
couple of problems with this view.  
Firstly, there is a manifest asymmetry between environmental pragmatism and environmental 
philosophy as a whole, which tilts the comparison. The first part of this asymmetry that 
pragmatism has so far had less time on its hands than the rest of the combined community. 
Granted, pragmatism, as a source of criticism against the conventional approach to 
environmental philosophy utilized this argument of non-effectiveness or non-practicability 
when the conventional approach was about as old as the pragmatic approach is now. Still it 
seems that if this is a valid argument, it is now even more compelling against the conventional 
approach than against the pragmatic one, as it has had even more time under its wings. Also, 
there is no denying that the approach of environmental pragmatism has consisted only of a 
handful of people during the same time, in comparison to the collected force of environmental 
philosophers, which seems to have had a greater chance to gain the larger impact.  The question 
arises then of why pragmatism has not been adopted to a greater extent by philosophers in the 
first place, if one of its main points of contention is adoptability. One might argue that if 
philosophers or others do not already find it compelling, it also fails on its own criteria. Again, 
unlike other branches that measure their success as argumentative validity alone, pragmatists 
are forced to include the degree of appeal and a relational component towards its audience in 
the criteria of success.  
There are two points to this, one regarding its appeal inwards, and one regarding its appeal 
outwards: the first is that pragmatism is still such a marginal position in the field, that we might 
argue that it has simply still not gained the critical mass18 required to be noticeable at all. As I 
mentioned, it has consisted of merely a handful of theorists, and its reason for escaping the 
attention of philosophers might be contingent upon this fact. We notice how this differs from 
the environmental philosophy movement at large, as it is most definitely in contact with a wide 
audience within the philosophical community, suggesting that its number of theoretical 
supporters are somewhat more reflective of its general level of appeal in the community, an 
appeal pragmatists could have enjoyed if it reached such a critical mass and area of exposure. 
The second is that there is a difference between being philosophically adoptable and being 
popularly adoptable. Most of environmental philosophers already admits this when talking 
                                                 
18 I borrow this term from astronomy where it indicates the ‘tipping point’ of mass required for a celestial object 
to sustain nuclear fission. 
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about the current supposed gap between the common naïve anthropocentrism allegedly held by 
the majority, and the more philosophically complex ecocentrisms held by philosophers. If 
monistic non-anthropocentrists are on their way to subvert this paradigm of common 
anthropocentrism, it seems we have already agreed that these two groups have different 
inclinations in theoretical intuitions already. If pragmatism fails to resonate with the particular 
ecocentric or biocentric theories of philosophers, we have still said nothing that regards its 
appeal to ordinary people. In fact, as pragmatism seeks to address and cultivate the positive 
aspects of already existing moral attitudes, meting people where they are, so to speak, it seems 
to follow from it very definition that it should be more harmonious with ordinary sympathies 
and rid of the need to secure moral converts before being endorsed by non-philosophers. If 
posed as a competition between pragmatism and monistic non-anthropocentrism, the score 
might well be nil on both sides so far in this matter of being ‘endorsed’ by the public. However, 
even if we concede that environmental pragmatism has proven equally non-endorsed in terms 
of popular acceptance (this equality under heavy doubt) it seems we can argue that regular 
environmental philosophies are either not known in the general public because of its non-
interest in popularising itself, and that if they were known, would have greater obstacles than 
pragmatism in terms of gathering acceptance full-fledged converts to their particular narrow 
versions of value theory.  
 
Secondly; it is not in fact given that environmental pragmatists have yet taken upon themselves 
to reach out to this wider audience. Given its position with a mere handful of people across the 
world that is currently defending it in the communities of environmental philosophy, it does not 
seem obvious that environmental pragmatists as of yet have the resources to propagate itself 
outside the frames of academic discussion. This does again have something to do with its 
position on the low side of its critical mass. It seems rather that environmental philosophy is a 
two-stage rocket19 that at present is concerned merely with arguing for the legitimacy of their 
approach, and not actually conducting the approach itself. First it needs to establish itself among 
theoretical supporters before it may also be spread out and proliferate in a non-theoretical and 
accessible form. The analogy to other successful movements like Marxism shows how it is not 
necessary for all contributors of a movement to be formally schooled in its theoretical 
dimensions, as long as it can be supported by a sufficiently large and united theoretical 
                                                 
19 I thank supervisor for this next astronomical expression. 
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foundation of philosophers and theorists. Therefore, this foundation needs to be established first 
before proceeding to the next step.  
 
Furthermore, many elements of environmental pragmatism is untouched by the criticism of 
falling on its own criteria – like the efforts of creating pluralistic common platforms within 
philosophical environmentalism, or the argument of focus-change towards action rather than 
aiming for philosophical resolution. Whether environmental pragmatism is a fit contender to 
accomplish this task is one thing, the need for it to be done, quite another. Arguments regarding 
the primacy of action and consequence over theoretical purity aren’t strictly speaking rendered 
less valid either by their being adopted or accepted in the scientific community, nor by the 
actions of their proponents. They might argue that even though the test of an environmental 
philosophy should be to what degree it has potential to eventually lead to practical change, a 
contingent lack of academic acceptance of this principle as a norm for further academic pursuits 
would not invalidate it.  
It also seems we can argue that environmental pragmatism as a school which is in fact oriented 
towards the goal of attaining popular influence, stands a better chance of attaining it than a 
different school which is not informed by this goal. It is hard to judge the respective 
potentialities of these two approaches empirically given only negative evidence. It is merely a 
claim that the strategy would be effective if it were adopted. Every strategy towards such aims, 
no matter how potent, is still dependent on acceptance from peers and adoption to be put into 
effect. The accusation that pragmatism also suffers from ineffectiveness can thus be met by 
claiming that it has simply not yet been employed and tested as opposed to conventional 
environmental philosophy. Further, even if rejecting this defence, pragmatist approaches 
contain many elements that are not invalidated by the fact that they have not yet been able to 
implement mass adoption.  
 
As environmental philosophy today is, with some exceptions, fairly homogeneous with respect 
to its endorsement of non-antropocentrism. Such a powerful position is not enjoyed by 
pragmatism. We might separate within environmental pragmatism the appeal to within the 
philosophical community as such, which is the appeal to change their strategy in relation to the 
general public, and their suggestion to the general public as such. Obviously, if the appeal to 
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the philosophical community is overruled, it is also not going to proliferate and arrive in a 
forceful manner to the public. If the general promise of environmental pragmatism, then, is 
modified to this if, then, the criticism seems undermined so long as the inbuilt criteria of being 
successful is not fulfilled. The promise of environmental pragmatism must in that case be 
modified to ‘if adopted as a strategy in the outside world, it would be more efficient than the 
current method’, But this begs the question of how academics could be exempt from the crowd 
whose impressionability to the theory determine the successfulness of environmental 
pragmatism. let through to envisioned as a chain reacting strategy working independently of 
whether it is being adopted as a strategy or not. 
 
However, this could be a rebuttal similar to the initial defence of environmental ethics against 
the charge of ineffectiveness; that absence of evidence corroborating their approach is not 
evidence of absence. The logical problem of induction tells that the lack of positive evidence 
can never falsify an approach in the same way as discovering white swans does nothing to show 
that all swans are white. The seemingly lacking results of conventional environmental ethics 
(postulating for simplicity that they are indeed lacking) might just as well reflect an insufficient 
force with witch the approach is applied, as it might show the insufficiency of the approach 
itself. Judging whether to march forward with increased force or whether to turn back, can seem 
an open question in this regard. However, such suggestions may seem unsatisfactory, as they 
place the burden of proof away from the proponents of particular theories and demand that we 
must hold a fundamental agnosticism in relation to any number of ‘environmental approaches’ 
that have not yet been proven not to work. There must also be some positive criteria for an 
environmental framework to be a valid contender in the discussion.  
 
Secondly they might admit that environmental pragmatism contains an inherently theoretical 
element, but still maintain that it also includes a practical element directed at a non-academic 
audience. In so far as pragmatists also make attempts at gaining academic acceptance, it must 
necessarily play out on an academic arena, but this frame needs not be mutually exclusive of 
the more outward directed approach in conjunction with the internal discussions. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly is the fact that pragmatists like Minteer and Manning do 
indeed stress the side of practical applicability of their approach as well, as in their discussions 
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of management of American public lands, and the political implications of pragmatism. (2003, 
abstract). 
2.8.2 Compatibility paradox of pluralism  
A second issue, which I will term the ‘compatibility paradox’, regards the potential tension 
between the pluralistic inclusive position of pragmatists and the pragmatists’ argument against 
monistic ethics. It might spontaneously seem weird when pluralists talk about the ethical 
wrongness of monism, as though the point of pluralism after all was not simply accepting 
monistic theories and incorporating them into a broader framework. It seems we also here have 
a self-referential paradox on our hands if we contend that pluralism is both opposite to monism, 
but also required to endorse monism. Pluralism is thus required by its definition to be 
compatible with those positions declaring themselves opposed to pluralism. However, one must 
surely agree that no theory can be ‘forced’ to count itself compatible with positions it disagrees 
with.20 That leaves us with the paradox that either pluralism is compatible with monism, which 
is an inherent contradiction, or pluralism is only compatible with theories that are already non-
monistic, which excludes most parts of the field in environmental ethics, exactly the opposite 
of what pluralism entails.  
This criticism, however, also strikes any other pluralism, and can be responded to similarly. 
Firstly, this critique would seem to be a conflation of the ethical and metaethical level, as Such 
positions as Rawlsian political liberalism would seem to be possible even within a context of 
political monist foundationalism. Even if monist and foundational legal peers reject meta-
pluralism advocating a single conception of the good society – their own – we can still promote 
democratic, i.e. pluralistic principles consistently, upholding that society would function better 
if applying tolerance between irreducible conceptions. Analogously, there should seem to be 
no contradiction when environmental meta-pluraliststs recommend moral monists to operate in 
less categorical terms.  
At this level, I am not sure how much pragmatists will be concerned about such paradoxes, as 
it seems not to have been interfering particularly with their work. Perhaps it will say that it is 
exactly such theoretical problems that have been prone to stop philosophers in their tracks 
before, which is an ach-example of the type of problem that must simply be put aside so long 
                                                 
20 This would sound like an abusive relationship to say the least. 
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as we see that things are working in practice. As we know, the latter option has not been the 
route of environmental pragmatism thus far, as it at the same time advocates to convert monists 
to pluralists, and also advocates the cooperation with those monists whom it is not able to 
convince. The paradoxical knot might perhaps be solved showing to some conflation of 
theoretical and meta-theoretical pluralism, if the debate between monism and pluralism 
primarily is a meta-theoretical debate, as meta-theoretical pluralism is not directly concerned 
with the correctness of first level ethical theories. If the pluralism in question is meta-
theoretical, it is not self-contradictory for it to support a broad set of positions working together, 
where some positions amongst which will deny pluralism. However, then this problem seems 
to remain in the case of first level pluralism. In any case, I think this can be confusing, especially 
to someone new to environmental pragmatism, and I wonder if you think the different levels in 
the debate can be stratified better.   
 
6.2.3 One of the more obvious answers to environmental pragmatism’s general allegation 
towards environmental philosophy of being ineffective and having ‘little tangible impact–in the 
“real world”’ (Minteer, 2012, p. 2) is a simple denial that it has been ineffective. It is hard to 
operationalize and measure the total effects of environmental philosophy to the point where a 
clear-cut and unambiguous record of merits is feasible. We must then also assume a frame of 
reference with respect to how far in the causal chain we look, and then include the indeterminate 
causal lengths forward in time and outward in width. some other than through counterfactual 
speculation. In order to estimate the relative productivity of environmental philosophy to 
environmental causes, it is possible to argue that environmental philosophy has had a profound 
and pervasive relevance to the slow turning of attitudes and action seen thus far – a relevance 
similar to the one of other social movements which have not been as a result of its being directly 
adopted by a wide fraction of people, but which have nevertheless played a huge role to the 
long term mechanism of social change. One could contend that environmental philosophy has 
indeed produced results mitigated across society, however in indirect and invisible ways rather 
than direct and visible.  
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It might well be possible to do environmental philosophy without any engaged interest for 
environmental issues at all, as some argue (Laplante, 2004), but this attitude seems the 
exception among environmental philosophers. 
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 Environmental systematism 
A crisis conceived as a first-person moral crisis 
 
One of the major ethical projects of environmental pragmatism has been to re-formulate it to 
enable a larger field of impact. To achieve this, pragmatists have mostly turned to pluralism 
and the abolition of classical dichotomies and of ethical foundationalism. As pragmatists widely 
agree with mainstream environmental theorists about the untenable character of conventional 
ethics, the dispute is mostly on what should be the alternative. Thus, much has been said on the 
meta-ethical front, as many pragmatists, particularly Weston or Minteer, have advocated going 
deeper in their break with old frameworks of anthropocentric ethics, than simply changing its 
anthropocentric content21. They wish to change ethics in a meta-ethical sense, to break not only 
with the content of previous ethics, but also with its form and structure. As this project is still 
in the very early stages of development, there seems to be much room for new ideas and 
improvement. Minteer suggests a 'third way' in environmental ethics that shrinks the 
antagonistic schism of anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric positions in order to facilitate 
a common platform for policy and practice (2006).  
My contention is that there is room for an even wider notion of ethics that aims to capture what 
Anthony Weston calls 'the ecology of ethics' and his 'enabling environmental practice' (Weston, 
1996a). If seems that any successful attempt to ‘enable environmental practise’, which 
according to environmental pragmatists is a prime task of environmental ethics, necessitates a 
holistic understanding of the mechanics of ethics on all levels, what Weston calls the ‘ecology 
of ethics’. This may well happen if ethics open up to an even higher level to address not only 
individual agency in isolation, but also agency seen in large scale at the societal level, and in 
the contexts that real practice and ethical conduct occur. I find that this wide approach demands 
a balancing of today's bottom-up, individualist, agent oriented emphasis in the orthodox 
conception, in favour of a more systemically oriented and top-down approach which moves its 
focus to the large overarching dynamics that govern individual behaviour, whether ethically 
deliberate or not. If ethics can already be seen as a tool for the channelling and management of 
                                                 
21 Bryan Norton, as discussed, defends what he calls a ‘weak’ or ‘considered’ anthropocentrism, but this is 
contrasted with the ‘classical’ or strong notion. As such, it arguably serves the same efforts to disrupt and 
reconstruct the old frameworks mounted on the anthropocentrism-divide. 
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moral conduct at the level of the individual, there seems to be an absence of a correlate at the 
level of society. Ethics could then be concerned not only with the question of what ethical 
conduct entails, but also with how to bring this ethical conduct into practice to make society 
more ethical. I consider this in tune with the pragmatic instrumental understanding of ethical 
theory. Again, it seems that ethics, like environmental philosophy, will fail as a discipline if it 
is unable to close this circuit and apply itself in the real world. 
The initial motivation for these considerations is the observation that even though 
environmental behaviour is considered the result of free choice and attitudes, we see systematic 
failure to change, which should not be expected given this current understanding. Many are 
highly surprised to find the lethargic response the crisis has received so far, given the moral 
character of human beings and given the information available. Critics are prompted to interpret 
the crisis as the result of either a moral crisis of human selfishness, or a lack of information and 
awareness. The suggestion that either of the two is the case, is no doubt good reason for surprise 
given what moral integrity we know human beings to be capable of and given what information 
on the subject has been available since serious attention to such subjects started at least five 
decades ago. Both result in the conclusion that further moral convincing is needed or that people 
need to be further informed of the reality of the crisis. When understanding people as governed 
by what they believe, and what they wish to accomplish – what is commonly known as the 
belief-desire model of action – it seems that at least one of the two parts must be missing if it 
be logically possible for humanity to omit significant action in response to the crisis.  
However, it is seldom suggested from philosophers that it might also be neither, but that the 
very belief-desire model is mistaken. Still, as psychologists have known for a long time, the 
belief-desire model of action has had be abandoned as it has shown poor empirically accuracy 
in explaining and predicting behaviour. In the interdisciplinary work Individual and Structural 
Determinants of Environmental Practice, professor of philosophy Bengt Hansson notes:  
One often talks about people’s actions as being determined by two things, what they want to achieve and 
what they know, values and facts. Consequently, we should affect their values or attitudes and provide 
them with new information if we want to influence their actions and behaviour. This is the misconception 
[…] First, people very often already have the ‘right’ values and attitudes […] Secondly, people are quite 
well-informed and can seldom use much extra information in a constructive way. What has been 
overlooked is that behaviour, even if ultimately based on values and information, does not spring 
automatically from them (2003, p. 218). 
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Given the way we understand the moral integrity of normal human beings, there seems to be an 
explanatory gap to the behaviour seen. When discovering such systematic failure, it seems the 
crisis resulting from this failure is not simply a moral failure, but a deeper and systematic one. 
This point is made by Slavoj Zizek when he says: ‘The question is not “are people moral enough 
or not”, but “why can’t they act in a moral way”. In what social circumstances are people 
allowed to act upon their moral views […]’ (Zizek, 12010, 7:25) If the accusation of a 
‘moralistic’22 paradigm of in environmental philosophy is tenable, understood as an exclusive 
focus on first-person moral explanations of environmental behaviour, it is readily obvious how 
it risks a number of maltreatments of the real problems. Firstly it can be accused of reductionism 
in reducing such issues which have large and intricate psychological, social, cultural, 
technological or political dimensions to merely moral ones, leading in myopically 
individualistic approach and neglecting regard to large and small scale mechanisms. Secondly, 
when basing itself on such a reductive view it risks misplacing or mis-prioritizing 
environmental efforts that would be differently organized if problems were understood not only 
as a result of personal convictions and personal actions. Thirdly, it may neglect the possibility 
that pervasive and stable behavioural changes may still fail to occur even if there could be 
waged an effective campaign to change people’s moral convictions. As I will argue bellow, 
both psychological and sociological assumptions that cannot be justified may have been 
committed, as research in these fields show that behaviour is not linearly predictable or 
attributable to attitudes alone, but are subject to an intricate web of interpersonal social and 
psychological dynamics.  
 
The alternative perspective is therefore what I will call environmental systematism. 
Systematism is the act of systematizing, or applying systemic understandings. Environmental 
systematism as I will use it here denotes the attempt to understand environmental problems and 
behaviours through their systemic features. This includes synergetic considerations into the 
causal understanding of action employed by environmental ethics. Following the general 
themes of environmental pragmatism, such as empiricism or holism, it attempts to move the 
perspective of ethics from the bottom-up first-person outlook to the top-down third-person 
                                                 
22 The accusation of ‘moralism’ is a common one against environmentalists, but it is intended here not in the 
derogatory sense employed by libertarians or so-called ‘environmental sceptics’ to oppose the idea of morality 
itself or social correction in general. Rather it indicates the preference for moral causal explanations of 
behaviour, which is often taken to the exclusion of other causal factors and perspectives. 
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systemic perspective. Systematism then involves the notion that ethical cognition or 
environmental action in large scale is not reducible to simplistic causal explanations or to free-
willist volition, but must be understood and analysed as a whole through the many complex 
large and small systems that spawn it. This includes both the external societal and social systems 
in which the agent is embedded and act in relation to; and the internal psychological systems or 
mechanisms that sciences like cognitive psychology are just beginning to chart. Environmental 
systematism here terms an approach that focuses on discovering these systems, both those 
internal and external to the agent, in determining how to disrupt and tweak them to yield better 
environmental output. It is recognizing that behaviour, although largely understandable through 
the moral perceptions that underlie it, is also in a mutual feedback-loop with attitudes and moral 
perceptions. Systematism then suggests that both are the result of many intricate causal 
relations, or ‘systems’, factors going far beyond the facts and values held by moral agents, and 
factors that must be analyzed holistically in connection to other moral agents and the dynamics 
manifesting between them in society. 
As argued earlier, conventional environmental ethics through the last 30 or more years has been 
paradigmatically united not only by its similar content, but also through its core meta-ethical 
understanding of the very task of ethics, such as laid out by Callicott or Katz.  Environmental 
pragmatists have so far been set to change not only this first-order content of ethics 
philosophically but also to challenge its surrounding meta-ethical format, in order break free of 
the old frameworks they deem inept to tackle the crisis at the systemic level.  However, it seems 
to me these meta-ethical ideas may be extrapolated further via the system oriented approach to 
ethics, in an effort to apply holism not only to the patients of ethics, but also its agents. 
3.1 The psycho-behavioural thesis 
As should be clear from the above, environmental pragmatists have invested much energy into 
investigating the evaluative thesis, and the concept of intrinsic value. However, the psycho-
behavioural thesis, as described by Brennan and Lo (2011) has been devoted considerably less 
attention as the second major assumption of environmental philosophy: 
 [M]uch of the last three decades of environmental ethics has been spent analysing, clarifying and 
examining the evaluative thesis of non-anthropocentrism, which has now achieved a nearly canonical 
status within the discipline. By contrast, the psycho-behavioural thesis is seldom discussed, but is part of 
the tacit background of environmental ethics. (2011) 
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 The psycho-behavioural thesis, as the name suggests, regards the causal connection between 
beliefs and behaviour with regard to environmental attitudes, and contains deep philosophical 
roots, as I will argue, in an underlying view of moral agency based on human freedom and 
moral autonomy. More precisely, as defined by Brennan and Lo, the psycho-behavioural thesis 
is ‘the claim that people who believe in the evaluative thesis of non-anthropocentrism are more 
likely to behave environmentally (i.e., behave in beneficial ways, or at least not in harmful 
ways, towards the environment) than those who do not’ (2011). Although it is rarely discussed 
explicitly, it is also fundamental to the motivation of environmental philosophy’s core self-
understanding as formulated by Callicott or Katz. Brennan and Lo argues: 
If the psycho-behavioural thesis is true, then it is important in two ways: (1) it provides a rationale for 
both the diagnosis and solution of environmental problems, and (2) it gives practical justification to the 
discipline of environmental ethics itself (conceived as the mission to secure converts to the evaluative 
thesis of non-anthropocentrism). (2011) 
According to them, the common structure of much of environmental philosophy, therefore, has 
been based upon a pathology of the environmental crisis that assumes anthropocentric attitudes 
as its primary cause, and therefore attempts in turn to locate the source of anthropocentrism. 
The common structure of argument, according to Brennan and Lo goes like this: 
(1) X causes anthropocentrism (X replacing sorts of alienation of nature, e.g. Christendom 
(White, 2008), disenchantment (Abram, 2012), or domination/patriarchy (Warren, 2008) 
(2) Anthropocentrism leads to environmentally damaging behaviours. 
(3) Therefore, X is the origin of environmental crisis (Brennan & Lo, 2011). 
Brennan and Lo seem to omit a step between (2) and (3) which I think is worth including, 
namely the causal connection between behaviour and environmental problems. A somewhat 
similar construction of the argument, which I will discuss in the following, ends up with 3 
causal assumptions and one conclusion: 
(1) Exposure to facts and values is the origins of attitudes. 
(2) Attitudes are the origins of behaviour. 
(3) Behaviour is the origin of the environmental problems. 
(4) Therefore, to remove the cause of environmental problems we must expose people to 
new facts and values. 
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The third premise might be the safest step of the three, but a qualification of the term 
‘behaviour’ is necessary before it can be granted, as it would have to go beyond the most 
voluntary and freely chosen sense of action. I claim that actions in the narrow sense, which 
includes only those most restrictive forms of deliberative and self-caused behaviour, cannot be 
attributed as the single, or even as the greatest, cause of environmental problems. It must rather 
include all human doings over time, including those which are provoked by the various degrees 
of necessity arising within institutions built without environmental awareness. When certain 
environmentally bad behaviours have been systemically integrated into the fabric of society we 
are forced to operate with a behavioural term that spans the entire spectrum from voluntary to 
involuntary action. We must admit that not all environmentally detrimental actions in the wide 
sense are subject to be halted by a mere abstaining from those actions. Vocational airplane 
travel, for instance, is not as much a free action as eating meat or conserving energy, although 
they are all part of ‘behaviour’. The institutional equivalent is pointing out the impeded ability 
of developing countries in ‘acting’ sustainably when comparing to developed countries with 
stronger resources available to do so. As long as sustainability is a facet of development, it 
makes little sense to demand is as though being a feature of agency, although granted that if all 
inhabitants of any nation magically were to drop dead, all their damaging doings would 
immediately cease as well. With this understanding of what counts as ‘behaviour’, the third 
premise seems prima facie acceptable.  
Moving on to premises (1) and (2) it seems these nicely sum up the psycho-behavioural thesis 
that «people who believe in the evaluative thesis of non-anthropocentrism are more likely to 
behave environmentally […] than those who do not»23. The assumption, provided this is an 
accurate representation of the underlying rationale of environmental ethics, is that providing 
new information and moral argument will ultimately change people’s behaviour. In a pragmatic 
sense this seems to be an overly atomistic an rigid model that does not account for the many 
dynamic features of behaviour that are nowhere near fitting in this common sense belief-desire 
model of behaviour. 
However not only pragmatic theorists oppose the thought that averse environmental behaviour 
will stop if only the individuals doing them think that they should. The strategy of brute ethical 
persuasion to attain behavioural change has lately also become contested terrain for several 
                                                 
23 The first premise is not explicitly included in Brennan and Lo’s formulation, but I take it as implicit in the 
intention to give a general description of environmental ethics. 
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psychologists and political philosophers like Anders Biel and Bengt Hansson. A pertinent 
question is whether the ethical revolution regarding environmental issues really can come in 
the form ethical missioning and gradual securing of moral converts as arguably conceived in 
the regular approach. This may indeed have worked in the past with other social movements 
for instance against racial, sexual, or gender based inequalities. However, we know from 
experience that they are long and slow, perhaps spanning centuries of social corroboration 
before substantive and infrastructural changes occur.  
There is no denying the long-term effects of substantial and sustained moral work, as this type 
of sustained effort – the moral effort – is obviously magnificently important and necessary to 
any deep social change. There is also no denying that important feats have been achieved in 
environmental terms in the last 50 years. However, we might have guessed that this readjustive 
and adaptive work would likely require more time with this approach that what was deemed 
available given the fact of rapid destructions and irredeemable damages that need to stop much 
more quickly. The empirical evidence of the last half century of environmental struggles makes 
increasingly clear that people respond to such factual and ethical persuasions quite differently 
than what would be assumed from the simple and rationalistic belief-desire model of behaviour. 
As the same information and appeals to action are repeated over and over, responses are often 
scattered or inclined towards desensitization and detachment, rather than adjustment. As 
mentioned previously, environmental concern is even appearing do decline in various places 
on the earth (Tangeland, 2013). In this frame, and given the disappointments of environmental 
philosophers, it seems empirically justified to challenge the undisputed approach to 
environmentalism based on the psycho-behavioural thesis and the attempt to influence moral 
perceptions. The ethical program of environmentalism has thus been criticized for its over-
simplicity or its overt disregard for systematic and structural features in the formation of large-
scale behaviour. Stated in the argumentative form above makes it easily assessable. Predictably, 
I will argue in the following that both assumption (1) and (2) in the reconstructed argument are 
problematic and not a very accurate model of real moral dynamics, as I believe the formation 
of moral attitudes is a highly complex and dynamic subject in itself, and the formation of 
behaviour equally so. 
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3.1.1 Sensitivity of attitudes to moral persuasion  
We proceed with assumption (1) from above: Psychologically, fundamental values are long 
known to be connected to personality and is thus relatively stable over time. Thus fundamental 
values get more resistant to new impulses once such attitudes and personality have settled after 
early years. As social scientists such as Elias Dinas show that although attitudes can change in 
light of new information, they are often based upon more resilient fundamental values that 
harden during the ‘impressionable years’ of early life in the same manner as political or 
religious affiliations: ‘When taken as a whole, the findings speak in favor of a particular pattern 
of attitudinal crystallization, namely that proposed by the Impressionable Years thesis 
[…]’(Dinas, 2010, p. 9) Psychologist John Bargh further states that: 
Evidence is mounting that we are not as in control of our judgments and behavior as we think we are. 
Unconscious or 'automatic' forms of psychological and behavioral processes are those of which we tend 
to be unaware, that occur without our intention or consent, yet influence us on a daily basis in profound 
ways. Automatic processes influence our likes and dislikes for almost everything […](Bargh, 2007, 
Abstract) 
This seems to contradict the first premise that presupposes moral action as predominantly 
autonomous, governed by the free, independent and rational consideration of facts and moral 
values, and of being unrelated to factors of age, gender, social situatedness, and so forth. We 
see that this simple model is not what empirically proves to be the case. Ethical agency in 
practise is not well fitting with the idealistic rationalist conception. As we like to consider moral 
agents as rational autonomous beings sensitive to new information and ethical deliberation, we 
miss the social and psychological dimensions of attitude formation, and the fact that most such 
deliberation takes place unconsciously. Views on the nature of agency based on unconditional 
freedom tends to treat mental values and decision-making as a black box (Dinas, 2010, p. 9) of 
free will and internalize the origins of all mental states accepting no excuse from outside causes, 
a view that obviously risks preventing our looking for other means to change it. Luckily, the 
widespread perception that human beings freely choose all their reasons for actions, or that the reasons 
for action is always the real cause of the action is now coming under heavy scrutiny from the 
perspectives of psychology and social sciences. Bargh further writes: 
When social psychology began to “go cognitive” in the 1970s it was nearly universally assumed that the 
cognition in question was conscious and deliberate, that people were aware of how they made judgments, 
 69 
 
and aware as well of the influential inputs of those judgments. This assumption seemed so intuitively 
obvious and “commonsensical” that few thought to question it – but fortunately, someone did […] (2007, 
p. 1) 
This new understanding of human behaviour appears to flourish in all other anthropological sciences 
but philosophy, which still lags behind in insisting to ground ethical discussions on the outdated view 
of autonomy and human agency. It is tempting in particular to attribute this approach to agency to 
the dominant views in the formative years of environmental philosophy in the 1960s and to a 
considerable inertia in updating views in accordance with models of higher explanatory power 
and scientific research into real ethical deliberation. Strict moral expectations toward the 
individual to bear all responsibility for its perceptions and beliefs, implying ethical 
libertarianism, associations go to such mid-century intellectual movements as existentialism, 
epitomized in Sartre, like in his famous quote: ‘[…] man being condemned to be free carries 
the weight of the whole world on his shoulders’ (Sartre, 1993, p. 553). Ironically, in this respect 
it might seem ethics, or environmental ethics in particular, is susceptible to the same inertia to 
new attitude formation as the general public it seeks to address.  
In want of the corresponding shift to take place in philosophy and ethics, current ethical 
theories, understood as regulatory devises for behaviour, often fail to encompass the larger 
structures within which action takes place as it assumes actions and attitudes to be made with a 
greater degree of freedom and individual choice than what increasingly proves to be the case. 
The dominant ethical theories seem instead one-sidedly directed towards individual initiative 
and a will-based, inwards search for resources to make better choices, rather than to look 
outward for structural determinants of action and the dynamics of attitude change. 
This can be interpreted as a continued overestimation of human moral rationality still at play. 
The re-evaluation of traditional ethics at the onset of environmental ethics may have been only 
half-way completed with the break from anthropocentrism, as it elevated the status of nature 
towards the human condition, but at the same time forgot to lower its esteem of the human 
condition towards that of nature. The ethical discrepancy between human and non-human was 
addressed solely by reconsidering and elevating nature, but not reconsidering humanity itself 
and its elevated status as divinely autonomous and inscrutable. Humanity’s predictably elevated 
self-understanding remained equally enchanted in the views of philosophers, and thus equally 
separated from nature by way of its definition as a fundamentally rational being, defining non-
rational influence as the exception, rather than the rule.  
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Currently, however, it may in any case seem clear that the conduct of human beings is not as 
dependent upon and dictated by ethical rationality as many environmental ethicists would think. 
When asked to explain their actions people will generally report their reasons to do them, and 
not what caused them to do them. This folk-psychological conflation of the categories ‘reason 
for action’ and ‘cause of action’, assuming they are one and the same, might be reflected in the 
way environmental ethics attempts to change action by addressing reasons rather than causes. 
Whereas the one is (mostly) translucent and readily available to the agent, the other is not, even 
if the first obviously affects the other greatly. Accordingly, this is not an argument that moral 
values and beliefs are fixated and unalterable by way of argument to reasons and to rational 
ethical persuasion, but it is an argument that aims to modify any assumed easiness with which 
we may expect arguments regarding fundamental attitudes to be accepted. The omission of the 
equally salient human irrationality, and its ethical and epistemological dependence on 
psychological, cultural, sociological or political structures in which the subject is embedded is 
conspicuous at best, but increasingly dangerous from a consequential point of view if not 
adjusted when used to solving the currently most pressing concerns of humanity. 
 
3.1.2 Sensitivity of behaviour to moral attitudes  
 
The second part of the equation is assumption (2) and on the causal role of attitudes and beliefs 
to action. It seems here we may equally invoke psychological knowledge to rebut the common 
sense idea that attitudes linearly predict behaviour and that behaviour is determined by attitude. 
Assumption (2) in the psycho-behavioural thesis is that of the causal role of attitudes; the 
assumption that knowing is doing – that is if people individually are only of the right opinion, 
they will start acting to bring about its implications. This linear model of behaviour as in a 1 to 
1 relationship with a person’s convictions will – like with many other dualisms – quickly 
activate the pragmatist suspicion of over-simplification.  
In contrast to the evaluative thesis of non-anthropocentrism, the psycho-behavioural thesis is 
much more explicitly disputed throughout other academic disciplines, although widely ignored 
within philosophical communities. The psycho-behavioural thesis then roughly translates to the 
assumption that human attitudes in relation to nature are the sufficient cause of environmental 
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problems. The role of attitudes in relation to behaviour, which is often assumed to be in a direct 
linearly causal relationship is disputed for instance by Biel, et. al. who ‘shows how behaviours 
with negative or positive environmental effects are often performed without such consequences 
in mind’ (2003, back description). As mentioned in the first chapter, Brennan and Lo remark 
how environmental philosophers ‘all seem to have one view in common: that anthropocentrism 
is at the heart of the problem of environmental destructiveness’ (2011). However, the reverse 
is seldom suggested; that anthropocentrism may also be caused by people’s actions. 
Psychological theories of the formation of attitudes show that this is likely the case and that a 
dynamical and reciprocal process without clear and distinct starting-point is at play. When 
people strive to maintain cognitive congruence and avoid cognitive dissonance between actions 
and attitudes, both actions and attitudes are subject to change in light of the other, suggesting 
that they are not in a one-way relationship to each other. When people in environmentally 
unfriendly structural contexts perceive themselves as acting contrary to their environmental 
values and beliefs, it is easier to attempt to justify the behaviour and modify their values and 
attitudes than to change behaviour within the social and infrastructural frameworks that support 
and facilitate it. When it is thus easier to change attitudes than to change actions, we may see 
how the former may lose in contexts where environmentally friendly behaviour requires large 
effort or sacrifice compared to the defaults of society. This is not to say that attitudes are in any 
deterministic relation so societal structures or that people have no direct conscious control of 
their actions, but it means that the linear causation model depicted in the argument above should 
be replaced with one of mutual feedback.  
 
 
3.2 Ethical agent holism 
3.2.1 Supplementing the bottom-up approach 
  
The last 50 years have been a rough period in ethics, since this is the second time a call for 
radical restructuring of ethics has been heard since the proper onset of environmentalism. It 
might seem to undergo a ruthless adaptive selection process akin to what Slavoj Zizek calls 
72 
 
‘crisis as shock therapy’ (2009a, p. 17). Modern ethical systems and theories seem to get tested 
ever more frequently against new types of situations and with regard to how we want them to 
function, after which they are either corroborated or abolished. Upon seeing that conventional 
ethics failed in accounting for our intuitions about nature, they had to be supplemented or 
replaced with non-anthropocentric theories, just as Newtonian physics were discovered to be 
incomplete upon the discovery of relativity in the early 20th century. According to 
environmental pragmatists we are now faced with another dysfunction of ethics, that also non-
anthropocentric ethics does not seem to ameliorate, namely the failure to penetrate and 
influence human conduct and function as a corrective tool in the Aristotelian sense of ethics24, 
which many believe is also a prime task of ethical theory. The current approach to ethics is 
conductive of realism in the sense that it advocates more empirically founded models of real 
practical reasoning to the effect of successfully influence this reasoning. This ‘realism’ is not 
necessarily indicating compromise, however, as in the usual accusation that non-
anthropocentric ethics go too far or that what is ‘right’ should step aside to what is ‘reasonable’ 
or achievable. Rather, it simply suggests the opposite of not-working-in-practise idealism, 
namely a different and scientifically informed approach to attaining such goals in accordance 
with the best of our knowledge on how real socio-political individual and structural change 
really happens. It is realism in the sense that it seeks to most accurately describe and account 
for the real conditions and workings of whatever it takes as its object of concern.  
The starting point of usual ethics can be rightfully described to lie with the individual, as this 
appears the most obvious point to discover agency. Commonly conceived, individuals are the 
proper authors of ethical agency, and being a singular ethical agent is both the necessary and 
sufficient requirement for ethical agency to occur. Quite naturally, if environmental ethics is a 
branch of ethics in this sense, there cannot be any other starting point than the individual agent, 
and the question of ‘what ought one do’ becomes nearly synonymous with the question of ‘how 
can we do what we ought to do’. When the individual is taken in isolation and seen as the 
sufficient and necessary cause of moral action, knowing the answer to the first question 
presupposes the answer to the second, namely that the individual must simply choose to do 
what is required by the ought-question. However, as I have argued, the individual is not in fact 
self-sufficient in its ethical deliberation, and the answer to how it can change its agency is not 
automatically given by knowing that it should do so, as seemingly presupposed by more agent-
                                                 
24 More on this below. 
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intensive ethical systems dominated by moral imperatives. When seeing agency as an exclusive 
feature of the individual, it does not seem weird that resolving environmental issues are usually 
pictured as moving from the bottom up, as in in grass-root organisation or engaging in 
sustainable consumption based on personal actions and personal responsibility. It seems this 
agent intensive, bottom-up approach to ethics can be limiting to where responsibility is put and 
where agency is expected to happen. This bottom-up approach to agency, it seems to me, can 
amount to a sort of hand-to-mouth environmentalism that has very little systemic stability when 
depending on the sustained idealistic support and effort of its supporters.  
Top-down systemic approaches to interpreting environmental problems, which contrast with 
moral private-enterprise-approaches have begun to emerge as well. With their explanatory 
perspective at the systemic level, they do not see solutions to environmental problems as 
coming primarily from within individual agents, but look to higher systems with a wide basis 
in political or social levels. Such writers as or Murray Bookchin with his social ecology, Garrett 
Hardin with this game-theoretical considerations, or Slavoj Zizek, who analyses the ecological 
dimensions in capitalism, all entertain an institutional approach to environmental issues that 
move focus away from the free will of moral individuals in understanding why individuals 
behave the way they do. The role of moral imperative or responsibility on behalf of the 
individual is toned down also in Arne Næss, who pursues a holistic experience approach to 
ethics. In fact, Næss even avoids the term ‘ethics’ in his writings:  
‘Naess and Sessions have emphatically emphasized the phenomenological spirit of deep ecology and 
downplayed dicta; the psychological realization of metaphysical holism makes ethics superfluous. As 
Naess has said, ‘‘I’m not much interested in ethics or morals. I’m interested in how we experience the 
world. . . . ’’’ (Keller, 2009) 
There is a scent here of Aristotelian ethics in the way moral practical reason cannot be viewed 
as a learned set of abstract principles, but rather must be viewed as an acquired habitual mode 
of spontaneous intuitive reaction, not dependent in each case on a rational calculation (cf. Kraut, 
2014). The pragmatic project of re-formulating ethics resembles this dynamic conception. Here, 
I try to broaden this re-formulation by looking for an even wider notion of ethics that turns 
away from the focus on theoretical moral reasoning all-together and aims to capture the 
spontaneous intuitive nature of moral reasoning in everyday life that does not normally involve 
abstract theoretical reasoning.  
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This wider notion of ethics seeks to encompass the social situatedness that make up the large 
scale structures of moral reasoning in society, capturing what Anthony Weston calls 'the 
ecology of ethics' and his 'enabling environmental practice' (Weston, 1996a, p. 140). I claim 
that ethics can already be seen as a tool for the channelling and management of moral conduct 
at the bottom-up level of the individual. If this is the case, there seems to be an absence of the 
correlate from the top-down level of society which attempts to channel moral conduct starting 
from the large scale structures and working down. I suggest that pragmatic ethics may open to 
this higher level if it is not only concerned with individual agency in isolation, but also with 
agency seen as relational and in aggregate, the same way it sees for instance value as relational 
and in aggregate. In this way, both the agent and the patient of ethical theory can be treated in 
the same holistic regard. This continuation of the pragmatic bringing-to-practice ethics is thus 
not only concerned with the question of what types of conduct are ethical, but also with how to 
bring this ethical conduct into practice to make society more ethical.  
Indeed from the consequential point of view of environmental pragmatism we may argue that 
a main goal of ethics must be to make itself superfluous. If people already perceive the world 
in such a way as to act morally by inclination, or in such a way that the moral intuitions that 
precede the abstractions of ethical theory are already innate, then no law or overarching 
principles are required to sustain this moral conduct. ‘Superfluous’, of course, is a strong term, 
but it captures the sense in which it is no longer vital to stable, long term sustenance of conduct 
and in which correct conduct is no longer dependent on it, in the same way that ethical principles 
are not needed to cultivate an ethical attitude in the Aristotelian sense. The need for such rules 
first arises when there is a need to communicate, to teach or to resolve dispute of different 
principles or pre-theoretical intuitions. Much in the same sense as grammatical understanding 
is unnecessary to a child’s first language acquisition, but first needed in the appropriation of a 
foreign language, so also are abstract ethical rules first needed where innate intuitions and 
attitudes are insufficient or conflicting. True, the assimilation and socialisation of both language 
and morals, both early in life and later, is dependent upon the continual correction and exposure 
to principles, but said socialisation is first and foremost a product of social embedding and not 
of principles. The further away from situated context any such appropriation is set to occur – 
the more artificial the learning, so to speak – the higher the role of abstract principle and the 
lower the role of socialisation. These principles function to convey such moral through rational 
or emotional deliberation, much in the same way as deliberation into a logical problem may 
function as to make intuitive what was before not intuitive, and may convey such intuitions 
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between agents so as to coordinate and correct the total body of intuitions or moral perceptions 
to enable cooperation and unity in the moral traffic rules in society as a whole. 
The moral reasoning of environmental ethics tends to use the language of individualism, and 
tends to address the individual moral agent disjoint from the rest of society, in many ways 
resembling other individualist social or philosophical outlooks. The self-sufficiency of the 
individual to bear full responsibility for its interactions with the world, and the inherent 
emphasis on the individual’s freedom to control these interactions seem also to be another 
aspect of collective agreement within environmental ethics. It might be one standing in stark 
contrast to the usual holistic outlooks that dominate environmental ethics, which tone down 
individual parts and emphasize the structural and functional facets of natural systems. I would 
argue that the ethical model adopted by environmental ethics, which focuses on individual 
choices in the same way as other ethical systems, is based on a belief-desire model of action 
which has, as argued above, outright been shown to be false.  
The pragmatic project of refocusing and re-formulating ethics has already taken several 
departures from both conventional ethics and environmental ethics. Rather than a new position 
within the established frame, environmental pragmatists seek to expand the notion of ethics 
itself into one that turns away from the established core ideas as conventionally conveived, such 
as inherent value, means and ends, and centeredness. In light of this, I want to suggest a further 
expanding on the reevaluation of ethics provided by environmental pragmatists. This 
conception attempts to even more thoroughly broaden the horizon beyond the mere dealing in 
moral obligations and rights.  
The classical question of individualism versus holism in today’s debate is usually confined to 
that which regards ethical patients and the question of whether ethical regard is due solely to 
the individuals it regards, or also to the aggregate systems themselves, which are comprised of 
individuals. However, as ethical patients are enthusiastically debated throughout the literature, 
there seems to be a blind spot regarding the question of the ethical agents. True, the concept of 
agency is already expanding into the non-human realm, as certain other animals, well after their 
inclusion as moral patients, are now exceedingly recognized for their rational, emotional and 
moral capabilities qua agents, as scientists discover ever more of their cognitive resemblances 
to humans in their ability for moral reasoning and a sense of selfless justice.  (de Waal, 2011; 
Ghose, 2012).  
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However, a different question is also needed: Is ethical agency and responsibility moral 
properties necessarily exclusive to individual beings? Can it be meaningful to ascribe a degree 
of moral normativity25 to greater bodies of human individuals, a normativity that is not 
reducible to the sum of responsibilities held by the individuals? Ethical theorists all silently 
appear to agree that individual agents can be the only proper bearers of ethical attitudes, and 
the only valid recipient of ethical argument. By extension of the usual notion of ethical 
individualism versus holism with respect to ethical patients, there seems to emerge a notion of 
an ethical agent individualism; in other words the attitude that ethical agency first and foremost 
must reside within the isolated individual. I want to stipulate the alternative view that can be 
termed ethical agent holism. It is based upon a systematist approach to action and ethics, namely 
the view that ethical action must be understood as parts of wholes, and must arise in one sense 
collectively, breaking with previous patterns and structural determinants of behaviour, whatever 
they may be. In this sense agency and responsibility becomes as much an attribute of social, 
cultural and political systems as it is of individual persons.  
3.2.2 The banality of environmental behaviour 
This notion is useful in the following. If, as so far argued, we must agree that the individual is 
limited in certain substantial ways, and therefore cannot assume the total responsibilities often 
ascribed to it, it seems that this responsibility must be assigned elsewhere, insofar as the 
responsibility and urgency to change the damaging relationships to nature remains equally 
strong. This responsibility, I argue, may be directed at the collective level. I have so far 
presupposed an understanding of responsibility that distributes responsibility in proportion to 
the ease with which this responsibility can be carried. If a person is not capable of fulfilling its 
demands, they cannot be held responsible for failing to do so. Equally, if a person is capable of 
fulfilling these demands, but only with slight chance of success, or with great cost and effort, 
the responsibility must be proportionally mitigated, just as judicial punishment is mitigated by 
the degree to which the accused may have acted otherwise. As long as there are predispositions, 
we understand that it will be more likely for someone to do a particular thing in question than 
otherwise. This is especially true when counting averages of many people. When considering 
for instance crime rates, high or low measures are rarely attributed to moral strength or 
weakness, but is rather seen as a symptomatic of something else, for instance social conditions 
                                                 
25 I refrain from using ‘duty’ as this seems to imply a starker absolute sense beyond the normative ‘ought’ I am 
looking for. 
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or other structural circumstances likely to affect general lawfulness. It seems like high crime-
rates are not entirely accounted for by the combined moral blame of the individual offenders. 
There seems to be circumstantial conditions as well, prompting crime higher than would be 
expected from an average population. Considering a similar example of, say, a crossroads with 
particularly high rates of accidents might evoke our suspicion that inattention or human error, 
although applicable to each individual case, is still not the whole story. Here also it seems the 
fault is not entirely with the individual agents, as they seem influenced by unfair odds from the 
beginning.  
Answering to these societal examples of system bias we have many different cases in point 
from each individual’s psychological perspective: The bystander-effect and diffusion of 
responsibility are different examples of behavioural phenomena only seemingly related to 
morality, but which proves to be due rather to structural set-up. The popular textbook example 
is the 1964 murder of Kitty Genovese that was allegedly witnessed by 38 neighbours without 
anyone taking action (Passer et al., 2008, pp. 38–43)26. While we are lead to believe that such 
failure to take action is indeed only attributable to moral failure, test subjects in research on 
diffusion of responsibility and the bystander-effect never display particular moral apathy in 
general and in most other areas of life, but rather prove to be normal average law abiding 
citizens. In social psychology and sociology we see countless examples of how surrounding 
groups make reference points against which each individual orients themselves and moderates 
their action.  
Such dynamics are for instance group conformity, and authority obedience. These show the 
unintuitive extent to which beliefs and behaviour of individuals systematically conform to the 
norms of its group, and demonstrate the strength of the systematic barriers towards dissent most 
people experience in a social group or community. The well-known experiments of Solomon 
Ash in the 1950s, that demonstrated the effects of conformity to a group despite better 
knowledge, and Stanley Milgram’s infamous authority obedience experiments in 1961, in 
which participants are requested by an authority figure to administer up to lethal electrical 
shocks to another fake participant, both demonstrate this enormous influential power of the 
social environment (Asch, 1951; Milgram, 1963). Philip Zimbardo’s famous Stanford Prison 
Study of 1971 further demonstrated the effects of group identity and the situational formation 
                                                 
26 It was later suggested that the story may have been exaggerated through lofty new-reports of the incident, but 
corroborative reproductions of similar effects abound in the literature (cf. Hogg & Vaughan, 2008, pp. 541–546). 
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of attitudes and behaviour, and the particular ways attitudes intensify depending on perceived 
in-group norm (2008). These findings were later used to study similar incidents, like the famous 
scandal of the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in which soldiers of the American invasion forces 
started exercising abuse and seemingly unmotivated torture against prisoners (Zimbardo, 2008).  
The results of both Milgram and Zimbardo’s findings support the external situational, rather 
than internal dispositional attribution of behaviour, which may be extended to environmental 
behaviour as well. These examples are all telling of the major hidden influences that are ignored 
when demanding social change to start from the individual. When there are no major norms 
against carbon intensive transportation, for instance, group conformity is likely to hold back the 
formation and consolidation of this attitude. This makes for great difficulties in breaking with 
the established social norms and practises relating to environmental elements. The practise of 
vegetarianism is a different example that requires very high social independence and moral 
integrity to arise within any community of carnivorism that may provide little to no support and 
reinforcement of such divergences. Arguably a great amount of similar examples relevant to 
environmental outcomes rest on such dynamics, as religious, cultural or political attitudes in a 
social group are tightly knit together. When social convergence plays such a heavy role, it takes 
a strong individual influence to budge the attitude of the group at large, and the group in 
aggregate will be very resistant to change.  
Having investigated the dynamics of behind both good and bad behaviour in the social context, 
Zimbardo later coined the phrase ‘the banality of heroism’ in reference to the opposite of 
Hannah Arendt’s phrase ‘the banality of evil’. In Arendt’s report from the trial of Nazi leader 
Adolf Eichmann, she undertakes to show the dynamics of evil behaviour and how it must be 
understood differently from the common understanding of revealing extraordinary moral 
character, fanaticism or sociopathy. Eichmann was not a monster, she claims, as his actions and 
willingness to follow genocidal orders are fully compatible with normal moral capacities, a 
perspective often used in a wider sense to understand the historical context of National 
Socialism and how it was allowed to flourish throughout a whole nation of otherwise average 
and morally literate individuals (cf. Arendt, 1963). It is in this setting we might extend Arendt’s 
phrase to a sense in which environmental behaviour may also be considered banal, and how its 
many manifestations, must be considered not primarily as results of individual moral initiative 
or value attitudes towards nature, but may understood at a systemic level which ultimately may 
allow for the alteration or manipulation of such systems. 
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3.2.3 Redistributing responsibility 
Evidence shows that strong predispositions make the individual persons start with a significant 
handicap, even if regarded as free in the usual sense relevant to ethics. To distribute 
responsibility in this understanding, we need to ask at what level the responsibility is likely best 
handled or managed. We avoid the many systemic or psychological traps in which correct or 
moral behaviour is bound to lose by rather asking who or what is most suitable for the job. The 
greater the power to fulfil successfully the tasks posed by particular responsibilities, the greater 
the responsibility we ascribe to that level. If we find that certain institutions or bodies of people 
have greater power to change courses of events than the sum of its individual parts, it follows 
that this body must be ascribed a responsibility and agency that goes above and beyond that of 
its individual human constituents. I wish to argue that there is more than enough compensation 
for admitting lesser human freedom, lying in the different organisational levels of human 
societies; from the smallest circles of community to the very largest at the national and 
international levels.  
When moving away from the particularities of the individualistic moral perspective, on to the 
macroscopic dynamics of the crisis, the nature of the problems seem to present themselves from 
whole new sides which are unavailable from the myopic confines of the individualistic moral 
focus. This perspective would argue that it makes as little sense to attribute environmental guilt 
or blame when moving the focus to the level of, say, the nation state, any more than it makes 
sense to charge a society with having high crime rates. The question then, is how to bring these 
rates down. The very concept of moral blame tends to deflate and loose meaning as soon as this 
shift of perspective occurs. From this level of analysis the approach of individualistic moral 
reprehension seems to be inapt and misplaced, as the issues from the large scale perspective 
appear to be social, political or even psychological struggles, and not primarily moral ones. The 
systematist perspective, however, must ot be taken at the expencce of moral statements, or 
understood as in denying the validity of moral statements to the benefit of systemic and 
impersonal mechanical explanations, but it suggests supplementing it with the equally valid 
large scale system oriented perspective to arrive at a holistic picture of the causal dynamics at 
play. It promotes understanding both the top-down systematist and bottom-up individualist 
framing of agency as mutually informing and dialectically evolving through the other. Both 
then become compatible and equally valid description of the same. It seems very clear that any 
accurate description is impossible from only one perspective, as it from the experience of 
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environmentalism thus far seems clear that we cannot moralize our way out of our problems. 
As Garrett Hardin puts it:   
‘Moralists try to achieve desired ends by exhorting people to be moral. They seldom succeed; and the 
poorer the society (other things being equal) the less their success. Institutionalists try to achieve desired 
ends by the proper design of institutions, allowing for the inescapable moral imperfection of the people 
on whose services institutions depend.’ (Hardin, 2008b, p. 355) 27 
My claim is that both a moralist and institutionalist explanations are needed to completely 
encompass the full array of interplay between the levels. 
 
It is worth recognizing that this type of responsibility distribution might conflict with the most 
common norms of distributive justice and responsibility. The current approach implies moving 
from responsibility distribution based on equity from personal environmental input, to one 
based on distribution from potential output. In other words, we will move from the distribution 
model where each person is responsible for their own private share of environmental impact to 
one suggesting that total impact is collected and distributed across society according to ability. 
Each person or societal organ is given responsibility according to what is within their reasonable 
capacity to carry, replacing the individualist capitalist mantra of ‘to each what is owed’ with 
the more holistic and collectivist slogan ‘from each according to his ability’. We move from 
the individualist thinking that requires each individual to make up for its own personal 
contribution, to one where each individual and each collection of individuals is required to do 
what it can. This stops us from expecting contributions where they consistently fail to be seen, 
and allows us to expect more from other areas of unexploited potential for contribution. Such 
principles, as long recognized for the distribution of goods and burdens in social economies, 
may be applied to the distribution of responsibilities itself in a planned effort to bring society’s 
collective sum of environmental virtues and vices to a positive value. If it is true that atomism 
and individualism in our view on responsibility and agency is part of the problem, we should 
perhaps consider this new sort of ‘economy’ for responsibility: If it appears that the budgeting 
of responsibility places too large a burden on certain areas where responsibilities consistently 
                                                 
27 The reason I don’t adopt the term ‘institutionalism’ instead of ‘systematism’ is that I want the phrase to 
encompass all levels of systemic dynamics and not be limited to ‘institutions’; and also that ‘institutionalism’ in 
Hardin’s coinage seems to imply an institution perspective at the cost of the non-institutional or moral 
perspectives, which is not what is intend here. As both moral regards and institutional dynamics must be 
included for a complete picture of the systems ultimately resulting in environmental behaviour, no one 
perspective should be taken as replacing others as long as they all provide valid causal perspectives. 
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fail to be met, and too small a burden on areas where it could be larger, it is clear that we must 
consider the distribution faulty, and that adjustments must be made to maximise the 
environmental output of the system.   
 
3.3 Institutionalist accounts 
 
Several detached philosophical contributions on a range of systemic motives pertaining to 
environmental issues have turned up from outside the epicentres of the environmental 
philosophy debate. Notably, as the top-down approaches to environmental issues are often 
given second priority within more traditionally environmental philosophical circles, political 
philosophy theorists analysing the political dimensions of the crisis often pick up this thread. 
However, it seems to me that these systemic considerations may need to be implemented in the 
environmental philosophy debate if the systematist account qua environmental philosophy is to 
have its due. I wanted to give mention to some of these perspectives without going into 
elaborate detail. Many discuss the role of capitalism and raise questions to whether capitalist 
economics and ideology constitute a viable system allowing environmental issues. John Stuart 
Mill’s ‘In Defence of Steady-State Economics’, for instance, argued that growth-based 
economics is logically forced at some point to readjust to a non-growth model, so long there 
are limits to total growth (2008).  
Many have, of course, impeached capitalism as one of the prime suspects. Arguably essential 
forces connected to capitalism, such as perpetual growth, increased consummation, mass 
production alienation and competitive individualism is often identified both as a cause of 
anthropocentrism and as a direct cause of environmental damage in itself. Radical social critics 
such as Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek even go so far as to claim that the current attempts 
to tackle the 21st century environmental problems from within the same liberal capitalist system 
from which the problems originated, inherently carry along the same flaws as gave rise to the 
problems. He contends further that ecology, rather than representing a scientific tool towards 
sustainability, has become a new secular religion substitute as founded on the Christian notion 
of the primordial fall and the loss of moral purity. He, echoing Murray Bookchin, laments how 
‘reunion with wilderness and Mother Earth’ has become the prevailing narrative of ecological 
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redemption (Zizek, 2009a, p. 97). The capitalist and new-spiritualist reception given to 
environmental problems has resulted in symbolic rites or sacrificial behaviour which thus 
unfortunately is motivated falsely and becomes ineffective against the real and big problems: 
What is really difficult for us to accept […] is that we are reduced to the purely passive role of an impotent 
observer who can only sit back and watch what his fate will be. To avoid such a situation, we are prone 
to engage in frenetic, obsessive activity – recycling paper, buying organic food, or whatever – just so that 
we can be sure that we are doing something. Making our contribution, like a soccer fan who supports his 
team in front of a TV screen at home, shouting and jumping up from his seat, in the superstitious belief 
that it will somehow influence the outcome. (Žižek, 2011, pp. 424–423) 
Such ‘frantic obsessive activities’ are illustrating of our approach to the crisis so far, according 
to Zizek, as we engage in environmentalism subconsciously motivated not by what really 
matters, but by what can make us feel like making a difference. By extension of Zizeks remarks 
we can recognize how the target of our actions on behalf of environmentalism quickly becomes 
not that with the largest possible output, but the dissipation of our anxiety through the cheapest 
means possible. The result may be plastic recycling or buying ecological tea but by that very 
same token feeing justified to buy the extra holiday airplane ticked. As long as commercial 
forces are allowed to capitalise on satisfying people’s desires to contribute (or more directly to 
dissipate their anxiety), it is in these commercial forces’ best interest to minimize production 
cost on their part, and thus the power of their actual environmental contribution, all the while 
maximizing the perceived environmental relevance of their product. What then is allowed to 
happen is the effective dissipation of environmental anxiety on the most marginal 
environmental measures possible, while more environmentally relevant aspects of society are 
allowed to continue as status quo.  
In short, the system contains a self defence mechanism, according to Zizek, in distracting people 
from overthrowing its core by continuously leading them on with insignificant but symbolic 
concessions. Quoting Oscar Wilde, Zizek explains the adverse effects of the charity institution 
and bottom up solutions: 
The proper aim is to try and reconstruct society on such a basis that poverty will be impossible and the 
altruistic virtues have really prevented the carrying out of this aim. The worst slave owners were those 
who were kind to their slaves and so prevented the core of the system being realised by those who suffered 
from it […] (Zizek, 2009b) 
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 Green consumerism, according to Zizek may be an example of such a distraction when it 
satisfies citizens’ need to react, but without the potentially dangerous component of any 
significant real change. The result from allowing capitalism as the overarching context of our 
design of solutions becomes inherently egoistical and atomistic motivational dynamics, leading 
in phenomena such as so called ‘green washing’ or other symbolic environmental behaviour, 
such as Earth day, replacing real and deep measures so long as people are made to feel they 
make a difference.  
Likewise, founder of social ecology, Murray Bookchin complains about misrepresented 
realities in what he calls a widespread ‘mysticism’ and ‘quasi-religiosity’ (Bookchin, 1994, p. 
22). This has come to take hold of environmental philosophy, according to him, claiming that 
‘even as its mind is Western, its heart is uncritically eastern in its sentimentality’ (Bookchin, 
1995, p. 99). It is in this sense we may say that the majority of developments within the 
discipline today are propagated by what William James would denote as the ‘tender minded’ 
half of philosophers, in referring to those of idealistic, rationalistic and spiritualistic proclivities, 
preferring optimism and a priory principles to sceptical realism and factual empiricism 
(Hookway, 2008). Such associations may indeed come to mind when for instance Holmes 
Rolston ‘seeks “re-creation” of the human soul by meditating in the wilderness’, or when 
‘critical theorists believe that aesthetic appreciation of nature has the power to re-enchant 
human life’ (Brennan & Lo, 2011, p. 35). Even without taking sides, we may readily anticipate 
how critics will point out that this is a poor strategy for crisis management. 
If correct, such whole picture analysis seems highly relevant to a sculpting of solutions to 
environmental problems. If these conclusions are justified a new pressing task for philosophical 
analysis should be to ask how these insights affect our environmental approach, and what 
measures can and must be met in order to change the output of such large scale dynamics. 
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 Summary and conclusions 
 
4.1 The argument so far 
I set out by investigating two commonly held assumptions of environmental philosophy; the 
first concerning the existence of intrinsic value in nature, and the second concerning the way 
people will react to persuasion of this value. I concluded both investigations with rejecting that 
the assumptions are absolutely true in the sense presupposed or that they provide a plausible 
basis for a viable environmental ethics.  
The first main chapter deals with the evaluative thesis of non-anthropocentrism through the lens 
of environmental pragmatism. It argues that the evaluative thesis of non-anthropocentrism in 
the specific ways it is articulated philosophically is not necessary to achieve the desired goals 
of environmentalism. It argues that even though we must admit value to exist in nature 
independent of human beneficiaries, it is not necessary to capture the exact nature of this value 
before environmental theorists and laypeople alike can unite to protect it. If requiring allegiance 
to any particular and arbitrarily specific theory or approach, environmental pragmatists argue 
that environmental philosophy becomes too sectarian and demanding to function. It seems to 
them that any number of different value interpretations and intuitions that exist among 
laypeople may be sufficient for a workable ethics even if such values are not philosophically 
reflected or even self-consistent.  
This does not need to collapse into a mere ‘management ethic’ as sometimes argued (cf. Katz 
in Light, 2002, p. 105) because the conception that these diverse attitudes and values are 
reducible to strong anthropocentrism is inaccurate. Environmental ethics should therefore draw 
on the many ways the environment is already valued and strengthen such values through open 
ended and pluralistic inquiry. Among the most salient suggestions for resolving disagreements 
around value consists in moving away from the understanding of value as foundational and 
firmly defined. The alternative would be introduced with the slogan ‘interdependence, not 
independence’, pointing to the holistic and dynamic character that seems lost in the atomistic 
independency based conceptions of value. I conclude with acknowledging Anthony Weston’s 
outlines of an interdependent theory of value, although remaining open and agnostic to 
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questions regarding the metaphysical nature and locus of value, with regards to value realism, 
subjectivism, value pluralism or the like. 
This understanding allows an open environmental philosophy to emerge based on proprietary 
intuitions most humans, and certainly environmental philosophers, already share; that the 
environment is infused with value in its many forms and that animals, plants, habitats and 
species, are worth keeping and protecting. This admits that clear-cut answers in conflicts of 
interest become more difficult, but this is arguably compensated so long as it opens the vast 
unexploited potential for protection of non-human interests in the first place. If this results in a 
more spontaneously prudential attitude towards the values of nature, destructive tendencies 
might be mitigated before a moral ruling is needed. Then the court cases of conflicting interests 
are effectively turned a minority. Given that this conception is tenable, it makes the case that 
environmental philosophy will do well to serve a strategic and coordinative role for the practical 
implementation of this protection, which seems to be the difficult part, rather than to expound 
further on the precise reasons for this protection. 
The second main chapter deals with my own addition to this project, and highlights some 
considerations to the second thesis, which has so far received surprisingly little attention from 
environmental pragmatists. As environmental pragmatists have painstakingly criticized both 
the content and importance of the evaluative thesis of non-anthropocentrism, they seem to either 
ignore or endorse the psycho-behavioural thesis. In this respect, it risks not to take full strategic 
advantage of a system-oriented approach. Here I feel environmental pragmatism is still 
underdeveloped to the extent that its purpose it to figure as ‘enabling environmental action’ and 
establishing ‘an ecology of ethics’ in Anthony Weston’s words. The systematist outlook that I 
suggest seeks to correct this apparent lack of attention at the higher systemic levels of 
environmental action, and this outlook goes further in questioning the centrality of value 
attitudes in forming environmental behaviour. Although admitting it as a major factor, it wishes 
to include the whole range of determinants as well that we have scientific reason to believe play 
a role to the outcome of behaviour. This total picture of the meteorology of environmental 
behaviour – so to say – aims at capturing Weston’s ‘ecology of ethics’. It aims at a dynamic 
and situated understanding of human behaviour towards nature, which rids itself of atomism – 
much in the same way as atomism and monism was abandoned in the value-question.   
It is in this sense I believe it is necessary with a big scale picture and a holistic approach based 
on scientific knowledge of structures determining environmental behaviour in order to capture 
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all relevant truths in our turning around environmental problems. As such, I think 
environmental pragmatism is a good step in this direction. The positive suggestions offered by 
environmental pragmatists will be diverse and subject to debate. However, as long as their goals 
lie in achieving progress based on common agreements rather than dispute over differences for 
its own sake, I believe this debate may be productive towards the goal of accelerating the 
environmental movement as such. Its conclusions may have to be fitted to a wider audience in 
the future, an outward orientation that seems far in the horizon still. However, as its progress 
towards its goals necessitates work on several levels, its work at the theoretical level is well on 
its way. 
As I have indicated, there already exists a myriad of valuable systemic perspectives on the 
environmental crisis, unfortunately (or perhaps luckily) far too many for my current discussion. 
I have touched upon only some, like environmental game-theory, as illustrated by Hardin; the 
analysis of capitalist consumerism and consumerist solutions, like in Zizek or Bookchin. Still, 
I leave behind a vast array of other contributions from authors in both philosophy and other 
areas as the social or human sciences that can help us understand why it is we do that we do 
and what we could plausibly do about it given this information. Work remains to assimilate 
these contributions and make them available for use in environmental strategizing. However, 
the structural system considerations presented so far should, I think, suffice to claim the 
following – that the most important message to be conveyed today is that the global failures to 
adequately dissipate the current problems are too consistent, too systematic to be explained by 
moral fault alone without also addressing the systemic features of such problems. These patterns 
are not the behaviour expected if everyone stood on bare ground informed only by rational 
deliberation and free personal choice. If the ways the game is rigged continues to be overlooked, 
it seems the address of the problems will proceed just as ineffectively and stagnantly as to this 
day. Both philosophers and scientists must then collaborate to discover and understand the 
systems and mechanisms at play so that changing them may become a primary focus of our 
attention. 
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4.2 Final remarks 
Some might ask why I have chosen not to use terms like ‘structuralism’, ‘structural 
functionalism’ or the Jamesian ‘functionalism’ to designate the current ‘system-oriented’ 
approach; or why I have omitted words like ‘consequentialism’ or ‘utilitarianism’ from 
discussion, as these positions are indeed quite consequence oriented in their wording. The 
reason is mainly that these terms, like many of the terms and dichotomies already disputed, 
contain philosophical baggage and historical and theoretical affiliations that I do not think needs 
to be included. As a meta-theoretical pluralism, the use of such terms risks restricting, rather 
than opening to the myriad approaches that would be valuable. I want the current standpoint to 
be ‘light-weight’ and avoid as many labels as possible in the attempt to provide a broad common 
ground within ethics and philosophy. I do not think that aligning with particular intellectual 
schools in sociology (a practice disliked also by James himself) is necessary, nor do I think a 
consequential orientation in ethics is the only way to yield valuable contributions in 
environmental causes, even if I might admit to thinking it an advantage. As to utilitarianism as 
an even more specific subcategory than consequentialism, I think it would be even more 
counter-productive, if not incompatible with the open meta-theoretical pluralism I endorse. 
Quickly lending itself to monism, it seems difficult to defend as a requirement at the meta-
theoretical level, even though fully committed utilitarians (as well as deontologists) are 
welcome in the collaborative meta-theoretical enterprise outlined in the above.  
However careful with labels as it might be, environmental pragmatism, as I understand it 
admittedly amounts to a thinly veiled defense of empiricism over rationalism in environmental 
philosophy. Quoting Hegel as I did in the introductory epigraph may then strike readers as odd 
seeing as the following pages set out to criticize an overly rationalistic paradigm within 
environmental philosophy. Hegel is, as we may know, considered by many as the very epitome 
of rationalist thought. However, in the spirit of William James’ attempt to unite the two 
fundamental cannons of philosophy – the rationalist and the empiricist – I think the quote neatly 
illustrates this attempt: Empiricist as James may have been, he wanted to acknowledge that the 
truth is rarely completely captured in one perspective or theory, because theories are always 
just approximations or abstractions of outside reality. Therefore, a synthesis, in the Hegelian 
wording, is needed. My intention has thus been to contribute to this balance between seemingly 
unsurpassable differences in philosophy. In the vein of pragmatism, the attempt is not to stifle 
the other part by showing how one version or the other is immutably correct, but rather to 
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provide a framework in which irreducibly different theories may coexist and even mutually 
inform the other to grander wholes. I believe this is about time: Theoretical physicists have long 
settled with the fact that two of their most defining theories – relativity and quantum mechanics 
– are utterly incompatible, but still undeniably true when applied to their respective large- and 
small-scale areas. However, as long as their grand unified theory of everything is still in the 
blue, the incompatibility must be left at just that, despite the intellectual discomfort it may 
cause.  
I have defended the general attitude of an environmental pragmatism, although I recognize its 
many articulated and unarticulated problems and needs for further adjustment. As such a young 
contender in the field, its problems are no doubt numerous. Still, after reviewing some of its 
opponents’ criticisms, as well as my own, I continue to be convinced of its core aims, namely 
the belief that environmental ethics should become practical, efficient and relevant to 
environmental, not only philosophical problems, and should play both a strategic and tactical 
role in the fundamental way we approach environmentalism. Environmental pragmatism 
satisfies some intuitions and indeed frustrations I held ever since my first introduction to the 
subject; that many positions and contributions to the field tended to theorize over the 
metaphysics of particularly romantic and pristine parts of wild nature, although this seemed to 
have little to do with economy, consumption or politics at the ground level aside from the blunt 
moral finger directed at it. It made me ask myself; is moral and metaphysical approaches 
appropriate as a main perspective on such problems? Is disenchantment, as discussed by critical 
theorists, or Callicott’s quantum theoretical ‘oneness of the universe’ (1989, p. 171), really the 
issue when considering climate change, consumptive patterns, or globalization? Can the 
recommendation to ‘identify with nature’ as in deep ecology be fruitful to achieve vast 
restructuring in human societies? Even Holmes Rolston, with his remarks about meditating in 
the wilderness, will surely admit that humanity as a species cannot meditate its way out of the 
crisis (Brennan & Lo, 2011). I felt that such approaches somewhat sidetracked and displaced 
the real problems, when, concerned with wilderness per se, it evaded the concrete dynamics of 
the human component, which seemed discussed only incidentally and fragmented by 
philosophers or eco-theorists outside the main environmental philosophy debate. As Ben 
Minteer expresses it, he fears that the more-than-human, in David Abram’s terms, comes at the 
cost of the fully human; in admiring the objects of our moral protection, we must not lose sight 
of ourselves and our practical task of achieving this protection. 
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As I hope contributions such as these may help bring serious societal focus firmly to the agenda 
of environmental philosophy, I realize there is a long way to go from here, just as there was at 
the outset. I have no conceit that environmental pragmatism or systemic outlooks may gain the 
explosive popularity that was sought after in the introduction, nor do I believe that it will be 
massively decisive to the environmental situation even provided its wide adoption. I am still 
quite pessimistic as to whether many environmental goals are reachable within the time 
available, such as for instance the 2-degree goal of global warming. However, I aspire for 
pragmatism and the systemic outlook to be helpful in both a negative and a positive sense: 
negative in dispelling some of what I believe are commonly held misconceptions and faulty 
foundations within some of environmental philosophy’s proceedings; and positive in providing 
further impetus to an emerging practical mindset in philosophy that is increasingly focused on 
politics, social change, resource management, anti-deforestation or animal rights, and the 
strategic planning that is involved in achieving results in such areas.  
Despite my many doubts, I will finish on a positive note by reminding of the real power and 
reach of philosophy at its fullest. We know how the ideas of Marx ultimately paved the way for 
an entire global revolution; the way the ideas of enlightenment thinkers as Montesquieu, Locke 
or Rousseau sprawled out to every far corner of modern societies; or the way Steven Segal is 
universally recognized as the worst part-time philosopher in all of history. There may be no end 
to the potential reach of ideas when an accessible common ground is established.  Knowing that 
anything is possible so long as the many act in unison can be a vital lesson in overcoming a 
mutual structural stalemate. In spite the deficiencies of beliefs and desires; they may 
nonetheless be our starting point from which the collective movement out of the rut begins. 
Knowing both what should be done and how is what allows a coordinated grand change of 
direction. People will never believe exactly the same. However, with a qualified optimism I 
want to cite one of today’s most popular fiction-writers on power, George R. R. Martin (1998, 
p. 120): ‘Power resides where men believe it resides.’ Overcoming resignation and believing it 
can be done is important. The trick, then, is making enough people’s beliefs, whatever they may 
be, work towards the same goals. 
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